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Foreword 
Although an essential program for the poor and vulnerable, Medicaid has for years represented a 
significant budget challenge for state governments. As the assistance program has expanded, 
policymakers have attempted to limit or rein in funding to slow its growth; yet today Medicaid has 
replaced K-12 education as the largest financial item in states’ budgets when all funds are counted. 
To reduce the fiscal impact, government officials have implemented numerous initiatives, including 
rate reductions, managed care to moderate utilization, pharmaceutical restrictions, and even 
imposing co-payments and cost sharing to introduce personal responsibility. Further, as the federal 
government has sought to reduce its share of payment, state governments have attempted to 
increase revenue by using practices that increase federal Medicaid spending with limited or no real 
state contribution. Despite these efforts, Medicaid remains a fiscal challenge to state policymakers 
as they also grapple with funding other budgetary priorities, such as education, transportation, and 
the environment. 
Maine is no different; yet its case is more acute. Years of system changes, expansions, modifications, 
and even some achievements to more appropriately serve the physically and medically fragile, have 
left Medicaid’s growth outpacing other major budget items, such as funding for K-12 education, 
which is necessary to achieve future economic growth and stability. Maine’s Medicaid system, called 
MaineCare, is suffering from inadequate financial resources to maintain current commitments. 
Thousands of persons with intellectual disabilities are waiting for necessary services to help them 
live healthy and safely; physicians lack adequate reimbursement and are becoming scarcer for 
MaineCare enrollees; information-technology systems are in need of enhancements; and the elderly 
population is fast growing. 
Like most states, Maine is in the midst of making a decision whether or not to expand Medicaid. For 
those states that have chosen to expand Medicaid, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), signed into law 
in 2010, transforms the program from a traditional program that serves the most needy and 
vulnerable to one that provides health-care coverage for everyone under the income threshold of 
138% of the Federal Poverty level.    
To ensure that the State considers all aspects of this important decision, the State of Maine’s 
Department of Health and Human Services has engaged the Alexander Group to prepare a feasibility 
study and analyze the complexities associated with making this determination. Consequently, this 
feasibility study is offered to help policymakers make a more informed decision based on the 
evidence and the merits. Although we have reviewed the most salient aspects of expansion to date, 
new findings and information will continue to emerge that may influence our overall understanding 
of the issue. 
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Going forward, the Alexander Group will review such data and may apply those findings to improve 
our analysis and forecasts. Subsequently, the Alexander Group may periodically update this review 
to reflect such new information.  
This feasibility study would never have materialized without the help of Mary Mayhew, 
commissioner of Maine’s Department of Health and Human Service. She and her staff were 
invaluable in assisting us to obtain data and other information necessary for our analysis. Her 
department also reviewed a draft of this study. Pursuant to standard practice, we incorporated 
those recommendations from the department that we believed improved the report before 
submitting this final version. While we are indeed grateful for the assistance of the department, the 
Alexander Group takes full responsibility for all statements, opinions, evaluations, and analysis 
contained herein. As we worked diligently to adhere to the facts, we are prepared to support every 
statement made therein. If any factual errors are found, we take full responsibility and will 
 issue corrective statements, if necessary.
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Executive Summary 
Background 
Maine’s Department of Health and Human Services has engaged the Alexander Group to prepare a 
feasibility study and analyze the complexities associated with expanding eligibility to its Medicaid 
program, i.e., MaineCare, pursuant to the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA).  
The Office of the Actuary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services predicts that if all 
states expand eligibility to Medicaid total enrollment would increase to an estimated 84.8 million in 
FFY 2021, for a 52.2% increase. The total cost would grow to $830.9 billion in FFY 2021, an increase 
of 94.4%. The actuaries noted that even if only those states comprising 65% of the Medicaid 
population decide to expand that Medicaid will grow faster than GDP, and they predicted that by 
2020 it would comprise 3.2% of GDP, up from 2.8% in 2011. 
For states, Medicaid has become the largest expenditure when all funding sources—including 
federal—are considered. Data from the National Association of State Budget Officers show Medicaid 
spending holds a substantial lead over the second largest state-budget category, i.e., primary and 
secondary education: 24.5% versus 20.0%. Maine’s spending pattern preceded the national pattern 
by more than ten years when MaineCare overtook basic education spending as a percentage of the 
total budget in 1992. Also, Maine spends the third-highest percent of its total budget on Medicaid 
of all the states. 
Fiscal issues are not the only challenge. A number of specialized Medicaid programs, including those 
in MaineCare, have long waiting lists. The low rate of payment to physicians has diminished the 
number of doctors willing to accept new Medicaid patients. Finally, federal Medicaid policy 
has historically favored costly institutional care, even in cases where individuals would be more 
appropriately served in less-restrictive home- and community-settings.  
Summary of States’ Experience with Expansion  
According to the most recent information available, twenty-two states are not expanding eligibility 
for their Medicaid programs, three states are currently undecided, and twenty-five states are 
expanding in some form or another. To date, states that are expanding are experiencing challenges 
with their eligibility systems. However, states are reporting higher enrollment in Medicaid than in 
private insurance since the Affordable Care Act exchanges opened October 1, 2013. The report 
provides brief reviews of the experience of 25 states and the District of Columbia. 
 Executive Summary 
 Page: x 
Results from the Financial Model 
The Alexander Group developed a customized financial model to forecast enrollment and the 
associated fiscal costs of MaineCare. The Baseline assumes two programs are discontinued: (1) 
parents 101% to 138% of FPL, and (2) the Childless Adult Waiver.  
Because of high poverty growth, the model predicts a significant growth in the Baseline. Thus, even 
without expanding eligibility, MaineCare enrollment is projected to grow by an annual average rate 
of 2.7%. Over nine years, this growth rate is a total increase of nearly 27%, which would add 85,700 
persons to the enrollment, bringing the SFY 2023-24 Baseline enrollment to 406,100. 
Under the Expansion Scenario, the population will grow more dramatically. The average annual 
growth becomes 5.2% over ten years, which would be a total increase of 66.7%. This would add a 
total of 212,100 persons onto the rolls over the ten year period, including the enrollment growth 
for the Baseline. 
The AG Financial Model shows the total cost (all state funds plus federal funds) for the Baseline and 
Expansion Scenario will be significant. For the Baseline, total costs will increase on average of 5.5% 
per year, which increases the total cost by 70.5% over a ten-year period. Under the Baseline, the 
total cost for MaineCare increases by $1.9 billion, from $2.7 billion in SFY 2013-14 to $4.6 billion in 
SFY 2023-24.  
For the Expansion Scenario, the total cost of MaineCare more than doubles by to $5.5 billion in SFY 
2023-24, an increase of 105%.  
For the Expansion Scenario, state costs would be $33.5 million in SFY 2014–15, or $45.3 million if 
the higher FMAP is denied for the childless adult waiver population when compared to the Baseline. 
The state costs are projected to grow to $125.0 million in SFY 2023–24, for a ten-year total of $807 
million, or $840 million if the higher FMAP is denied.  
Maine had 24.7% of its overall state population enrolled in MaineCare in SFY 2012-13. This 
percentage will grow to 29.0% by SFY 2023-24 under the Baseline. Under the Expansion Scenario, 
however, 37.9% of the overall state population will be enrolled in Medicaid. 
In terms of state funds, the budget for MaineCare services has been growing faster than the rest of 
the state budget (6.0% average annual growth versus 2.2%). The AG Financial Model forecasts that 
the Baseline average annual growth rate will be 5.5%. However, if Maine elects to expand 
MaineCare eligibility, the forecasted growth rate becomes 6.2%.  
The percentage of the General Fund budget dedicated to MaineCare services is projected to grow 
from 24.2% in SFY 2012–13 to 36.2% under the Baseline. Under the Expansion Scenario, however, 
MaineCare will require 38.7% of the General Fund budget. For the overall budget, including federal 
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funds, MaineCare will require 45.3% of the total budget under expansion in SFY 2023-24 as opposed 
to 40.2% under the Baseline. 
One quick way to evaluate the economic impact is to compare MaineCare enrollment to 
employment. In SFY 2012–13, the ratio was 1 to 1.8, meaning that each person on MaineCare was 
supported by 2 employed persons. That ratio will drop to 1 to 1.3 in 2020 under the Expansion 
Scenario. 
Risk Analysis 
The scenarios generated by the financial model are based on a number of key assumptions on values 
of factors that will determine what trends will prevail in the future. Each value chosen was in the 
middle of an expected range of possibilities. There is risk, however, that the actual values that will 
be realized in the future will fall toward either end of the ranges as opposed to in the middle. Low-
end values are defined as those values that would cause enrollment and costs to be lower than 
forecasted. High-end values are those values that would cause enrollment and cost to be more than 
forecasted. 
Four risk factors chosen to be analyzed are the poverty growth rates, Per Member Per Month 
(PMPM) cost growth rates, individuals with private insurance losing coverage (private drop), and 
FMAP rate changes. In addition, two best case scenarios and two worst-case scenarios were run. 
The first set assumed that the three of those four risk factors will have values that fall on either the 
low-end or high-end of their respective ranges. The second set assumed that all four risk factors will 
fall on the low-end or high-end of their respective ranges. 
Variance in the poverty growth risk factor would cause enrollment for the Baseline to vary from           
-5.9% to +6.2% off the middle by SFY 2023-24, and it would cause the state cost over the ten years 
for the Baseline to vary from -4.0% to +4.1% off the middle. Total expansion enrollment would vary 
from 117,100 to 131,300 in SFY 2023-24 as measured from the Baseline. State costs over ten years 
for the expansion would vary from $777 million to $837 million relative to the Baseline. 
Variance in the PMPM cost risk factor would cause the state cost of the Baseline to vary from -6.4% 
to +6.8% off the middle over the ten years. The ten-year state cost for the expansion would vary 
from $750 million to $867 million as measured from the Baseline. 
Variance in the private drop risk factor would cause the expansion enrollment to vary from 116, 000 
to 144,200 by SFY 2023-24. State costs over ten years for the Expansion Scenario would vary from 
$764 million to $920 million relative to the Baseline. 
Variance in the FMAP risk factor would cause the state cost of the Baseline to vary from -10.7% to 
+1.6% off the middle over the ten years. State costs over ten years for the Expansion Scenario would 
vary from $766 million to $2.45 billion relative to the Baseline. 
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The 3-out-of 4 best-case scenario assumed low-end values for the following risk factors: poverty 
growth, PMPM growth, and private drop. The 3-out-of-4 worst-case scenario assumed high-end 
values for PMPM growth, private drop, and FMAP. Variance in these best case / worst-case scenarios 
would cause enrollment for the Baseline to vary from -5.9% to 0% off the middle by SFY 2023-24, 
and it would cause the ten-year state costs for the Baseline to vary from -9.9% to 8.6. Total 
expansion enrollment would vary from 109,500 to 144,200 in SFY 2023-24 relative to the Baseline 
with 35.2% and 39.4% of the population enrolled in MaineCare, respectively. State costs over ten 
years for the expansion would vary from $685 million to $3.05 billion relative to the Baseline. 
Variance in the 4-out-of-4 best case / 4-out-of-4 worst-case scenarios would cause enrollment for 
the Baseline to vary from -5.9% to +6.4% off the middle by SFY 2023-24, and it would cause the ten-
year state costs for the Baseline to vary from -19.5% to +13.2% off the middle. Total expansion 
enrollment would vary from 109,500 to 152,700 in SFY 2023-24 relative to the Baseline, with 35.2% 
and 41.8% of the population enrolled in MaineCare, respectively. State costs over ten years for the 
expansion would vary from $649 million to $3.16 billion relative to the Baseline. 
Conclusion 
The AG Financial Model demonstrates that it will be challenging for Maine to afford MaineCare in 
the future even without expansion. Given current trends, MaineCare will comprise larger shares of 
Maine’s General Fund budgets. Expanding eligibility will only exacerbate the trend, whereby 
MaineCare will comprise 38.7% of the General Fund budget in ten years. In addition, risk analysis 
shows that the best-case Expansion Scenario would still cost the state $649 million over the next 
ten years in addition to the cost of the Baseline. In total funds (all state and federal funds), the best-
case scenario for expansion would have a ten-year cost of $6.3 billion. The worst-case scenario, 
however, would cost the state $3.16 billion over the next ten years in addition to the cost of the 
Baseline. In total funds, the worst-case scenario for expansion would have a ten-year cost of $9.4 
billion. 
The more pressing needs are restructuring and streamlining to make MaineCare more efficient and 
to deliver better quality outcomes. While health-care access and improved health outcomes remain 
an imperative, expansion of Medicaid may not be the best policy choice to achieve those goals. 
Other viable alternatives may allow Maine to improve access and quality while prioritizing needs 
and saving tax dollars. Consequently, Maine needs a state-based solution with flexibility from the 
federal government that focuses on access, transparency, quality, personal responsibility, and 
efficiency.  That alternative would offer executive and legislative policymakers greater budgetary 
certainty, and allow them to focus on other fiscal and policy priorities.
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Section I: Introduction 
Overview 
The Alexander Group (AG) was asked to “review the proposed Medicaid expansion currently offered 
under the Affordable Care Act and offer a feasibility study for Maine.” MaineCare1 is the Medicaid 
program for the State of Maine. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA)2 mandates that states expand 
eligibility for their Medicaid programs to include all persons with incomes equal to or less than 133% 
of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL)3 as defined by the law, plus a 5% income disregard effectively 
extending eligibility to 138% of FPL ($15,856 for an individual; $32,499 for a family of four in 2013.) 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Congress exceeded its authority in mandating the expansion of 
eligibility, thus giving each state the choice on whether it wants to expand eligibility as defined by 
the ACA.  
Medicaid in Brief 
Medicaid4 is a cooperative program between states and the federal government to provide health 
care benefits to low-income individuals who also meet eligibility requirements of predefined 
categories. In order to receive federal matching funds, states must provide benefits for numerous 
mandatory eligibility categories, which are often summarized as pregnant women, infants and 
children, low-income families, disabled individuals, and the elderly. Each mandatory population has 
its own set of eligibility rules. 
States may also receive federal matching funds for programs that cover optional categories of 
individuals, and there is considerable variation and complexity in how these optional categories are 
defined. Federal law further provides for waivers to allow states some flexibility in designing 
programs outside current program parameters. These waivers require approval of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS) in order to receive federal matching funds. 
States also are allowed to modify their Medicaid State Plan (the contract between the state and the 
Federal government that describes the state’s Medicaid program) through something called the 
                                                     
1  As used in this report, MaineCare includes all means-tested medical assistance programs administered by the Maine Department 
of Health and Human Services, including CubCare.  
2  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Law No. 111-148, was amended by the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Public Law No. 111-152, and is referred to in this study as the Affordable Care Act (ACA).  
3  The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services annually publishes poverty guidelines in the Federal Register for 
administrative purposes of determining eligibility for various federal programs. These guidelines are often referred to as the 
Federal Poverty Level (FPL). 
4  Enacted in 1965, Medicaid is found in Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Public Law 105-33, 
established the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), which became known as the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP) after March 2009. Found in Title XXI of the Social Security Act, it is common to use CHIP and SCHIP 
interchangeably. Often, and in most contexts, CHIP is considered part of Medicaid. 
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State Plan Amendment (SPA) process. SPAs allow states to request basic program changes, make 
corrections, or send the federal government updates on their programs. Although waivers allow for 
more flexibility to test new and innovative models of care or new ways to deliver care, both the 
waiver and the SPA are referred to as the legal authority states possess to change their Medicaid 
programs.5 
State participation in Medicaid is optional, but all states do participate.6 The federal government 
provides matching funds via a formula using a three year average of state per capita income7, known 
as the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP). States with lower per capita incomes relative 
to the national average receive higher FMAPs while states with higher per capita income receive 
lower FMAPs. However, no state receives less than fifty percent. Generally, FMAPs vary from year-
to-year based not only on annual fluctuations of per capita income but also due to changes in 
Federal law.8  
The ACA and the Court Decision 
The ACA is a complex piece of legislation having ten separate titles that comprise 907 pages in the 
consolidated version published by the U.S. House Office of the Legislative Counsel for the use of its 
attorneys and its clients. In its implementation, it has generated thousands of pages of federal 
regulations, and it impacts Medicare9, Medicaid, the states that administer Medicaid, health-care 
providers, health-care device manufacturers, and potentially every citizen because of the 
                                                     
5  Each time a state wants to make changes to its existing Medicaid system, it must go through these administrative processes with 
the Federal government.  These processes are often times tedious, laborious, and outmoded. 
6  Arizona was the last state in the Union to implement Medicaid, doing so in 1982, 17 years after President Lyndon Johnson signed 
the program into law. 
7  Per capita income is mathematically determined by dividing total income by total population.  
8  A few examples include changes to the FMAP in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended), 
federal deficit reduction proposals originally offered in late 2011, which would amend the FMAP rate, and the disaster-related 
FMAP adjustment. 
9  Medicare and Medicaid should not be confused. Medicare is a federally run program to provide basic health care coverage for 
most Americans age 65 or older and certain groups of disabled individuals under 65 who are receiving social security benefits. 
Medicaid is a federal program to provide support to the states to run means-tested programs for specific categories of low income 
individuals and is the subject of this study and described in greater detail throughout this report.  More formerly titled HEALTH 
INSURANCE FOR THE AGED AND DISABLED found in Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, Medicare was created as part of the Social 
Security Amendments of 1965 to provide health care coverage for aged persons to complement retirement, survivors, and 
disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. In 1973, the program was expanded to include groups of individuals 
with disabilities, including those entitled to Social Security or Railroad Retirement disability cash benefits for at least 24 months 
and most persons with end-stage renal disease. The Program was expanded again in 2001 and 2010 to other small groups of 
individuals.  Although Medicare has an established Trust Fund that initially was to be funded primarily from revenues collected 
from payroll deductions, currently at 2.9% of earnings, this is no longer the case. According to the 2013 Annual Report of the 
Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund, total expenses for 
Calendar Year 2012 were $574.2 billion, but revenue from payroll deductions equaled only $205.7 billion. The Trust Fund received 
$214.4 billion from general revenue of the federal government, $8.4 million from transfers from the states, and it still ran a $37.2 
billion deficit. According to the report, the Trust Fund ended the year with assets of $287.6 billion, which are mostly held as 
Treasury notes and bonds guaranteed by the federal government. There were 42.1 million aged persons and 8.4 million disabled 
persons on Medicare for the calendar year.  
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widespread impact on the health-care industry and the many changes to the Internal Revenue Code 
that create new taxes and penalties. The impact on the states is quite extensive, requiring states to 
determine Medicaid eligibility by a new Modified Adjusted Gross Income (MAGI) methodology, to 
make numerous system changes to their Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS) for 
both claims and providers, and to adopt a new national coding system, to name a few.10  
Title II, of the ACA, called the “Role of Public Programs,” is a section of the law that makes significant 
changes to Medicaid. Most important for this study is the pre-Supreme Court ruling mandate that 
states must expand Medicaid eligibility to include all persons at 138% of FPL or below. When the 
ACA was passed into law, no state covered all persons at or below that defined income level. The 
penalty for states choosing not to expand would be the loss of all federal matching funds.  
To the crafters of the ACA, Medicaid was an important piece of the law. It was the chosen 
mechanism to provide health insurance for all individuals at 138% of FPL or below as part of a plan 
to provide health care for all Americans. The ACA introduces new standards for employer-based 
insurance plans, and it mandated the creation of health care insurance exchanges, either federally 
or state run. These exchanges are intended to help individuals, families, and small businesses obtain 
health care insurance coverage.  
The ACA has numerous financial incentives and disincentives. For example, employers with fifty or 
more employees will be penalized if they do not provide health care benefits. Notwithstanding some 
exceptions, individuals without health insurance as defined by the law would be subject to a tax 
penalty. It provides tax incentives for persons with income between 100% and 400% of FPL to 
purchase health care insurance. It provides significantly higher levels of FMAPs for states to help 
cover the cost of new populations enrolling in Medicaid, and it penalizes states who do not expand 
by denying them federal assistance for Medicaid. 
Twenty-six states, several individuals, and the National Federation of Independent Business brought 
suit in Federal District Court, challenging the constitutionality of two aspects of the law: the 
individual mandate and the requirement that states must expand their Medicaid program. 
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court issued its decision in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB v. Sebelius).11 The issues were separately addressed. In a 5-4 decision, the 
Court ruled that the individual mandate penalty was not a penalty, as defined by the law, but rather 
a tax for constitutional purposes and thus was constitutional under the general taxing power of 
                                                     
10  The American Action Forum provides one calculation on Maine’s regulatory impact to be upwards of $119 million dollars through 
October 2012 requiring the equivalent of 97 workers to deal with the new work mandated by the ACA.  See Sam Batkins, “State 
by State Impact of ACA Regulations,” American Action Forum, October 2012, accessed at: 
http://americanactionforum.org/sites/default/files/ACA_regs.pdf. 
11  National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.11-393, June 2012. 
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Congress. In a 7-2 decision, however, the Court ruled in 
favor of the claimants saying that the requirement that 
states expand Medicaid was unconstitutional.  
In striking down the mandatory Medicaid expansion 
requirement, the Court underscored the fact that the 
Medicaid program was established to assist vulnerable 
citizens, defined as “pregnant women, children, needy 
families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled,” in 
obtaining medical care. While it is common for Congress to 
place limitations on federal funding, the Court has ruled 
over the years that the nature of the limitations must maintain a voluntary action on the part of the 
states or else it risks violating the state-federal relationship guaranteed by the Constitution. The 
following quote from the decision summarizes the legal logic.  
“Therefore, if States really have no choice other than to accept the package, the offer is 
coercive, and the conditions cannot be sustained under the spending power.  . . . In sum, it is 
perfectly clear from the goal and structure of the ACA that the offer of the Medicaid 
Expansion was one that Congress understood no State could refuse. The Medicaid 
Expansion therefore exceeds Congress' spending power and cannot be implemented.”12 
The effect of the court decision in NFIB v. Sebelius is that states have a choice on whether or not to 
transform their Medicaid program from a program to assist mandatory and optional categories of 
individuals into a program to provide health-care coverage for everyone under the federally 
established income level, and Congress is prohibited from penalizing states that decline the offer.  
Importance of Feasibility 
The decision to expand eligibility for Medicaid involves multiple layers of complexities. MaineCare 
is very complex as is the ACA and the health care industry itself, especially as configured in the 
United States. In addition, MaineCare is just one part of a larger welfare assistance system, 
compounding the complexity. Overlaying these complexities are a fundamental policy controversy 
over what kind of health care system can best provide for society, not only in regard to providing 
health care but also on its impact on the economy. The opinions on the matter vary widely, ranging 
from those who prefer pure market forces to those who advocate for a command system totally run 
by the government.13 The question has become highly politicized, as expected, but the politicization 
                                                     
12  Ibid, pp. 35 and 46. 
13  To read opposing views of a free market system and a single payer government system, See D. Eric Schansberg, “Envisioning a 
Free Market in Health Care,” Cato Journal. Vol. 31. No.1 (2011) and “How Single-Payer Health System Reform Improves Quality.” 
Dr. Gordon Schiff and the Physicians for a National Health Program (PNHP) Working Group on Quality. Adapted from “A Better 
Quality Alternative: Single-Payer Health System Reform,” Journal of the American Medical Association, September 1994. Accessed 
at: www.pnhp.org/facts/quality.pdf. 
Although the Supreme Court in 
NFIB v Sebelius decided that states 
possess a choice to expand or not, 
the expansion provision in the ACA 
still fundamentally transforms the 
program from one that covers the 
most vulnerable to one covering 
all citizens under 138% of the 
federal poverty level. 
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can become problematic if policymakers begin to ignore facts and empirical findings in favor of 
philosophical notions. 
Although the ACA became politically divisive from its inception, it seems to align well with those 
who have philosophical leanings toward expansive government-run systems. The purpose of this 
study, however, is to provide factual, analytical, and empirically-based evidence to help the 
Governor and policymakers understand the potential financial, operational, and performance 
implications and challenges that will have longstanding effects on the economic future of the State 
of Maine and its citizens. 
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Section II: Medicaid Finance and Outcomes—National Perspective 
Overview 
This section provides a high-level overview of the finances, outcomes, and special issues relating to 
Medicaid programs from a national perspective as well as the view from the states, with a special 
emphasis on the State of Maine. 
Official US Government Forecast 
The Office of the Actuary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services annually publishes 
an actuarial report on Medicaid that provides a forecast on both enrollment and Medicaid costs. 
While there are competing forecasts available, and perhaps some may ultimately prove to be more 
accurate, the official forecast is nonetheless appropriate to use for the purpose of obtaining a 
picture of how enrollment and costs will track and trend in the future. Clearly, the predictions may 
not all turn out to be completely accurate, but forecasting is not an exact science and it would be 
difficult to know which other forecasts may be more reliable.14  
An important challenge faced by the USDHHS actuaries in producing this report15 was determining 
the number of states that would decide to expand eligibility pursuant to the ACA. They resolved the 
issue by assuming “55% of potentially newly eligible enrollees reside in States that would expand 
Medicaid eligibility in 2014 and that 65% reside in States that would expand eligibility in 2015 and 
later years.” Thus, three scenarios were created: (1) no states expand pursuant to the ACA (labeled 
as the “no expansion” scenario), (2) some states comprising ultimately 65% of the eligible population 
expand (labeled the “baseline” scenario), and (3) all states expand (labeled the “full expansion” 
scenario).  
As shown on the chart in Figure 1,16 the Office of the Actuary forecasts that the Medicaid enrollment 
will expand from 55.7 million in Federal Fiscal Year (FFY) 2011 to 77.9 million in FFY 2021 under the 
baseline scenario, which is a 39.8% increase. Under full expansion, total enrollment would increase 
to an estimated 84.8 million in FFY 2021, for a 52.2% increase. 
                                                     
14  Forecasting allows states to adjust future expectations based on past and or recent performance. 
15  Office of the Actuary, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, United States Department of Health & Human Services, 2012 
Actuarial Report on the Financial Outlook for Medicaid, by Christopher J. Truffer, F.S.A., John D. Klemm, Ph.D., A.S.A., M.A.A.A. 
Christian J. Wolfe, A.S.A., Kathryn E. Rennie and Jessica F. Shuff. 2012. Accessed at: http://medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-
Information/By-Topics/Financing-and-Reimbursement/Downloads/medicaid-actuarial-report-2012.pdf 
16  Ibid, p. 40. 
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According to the actuarial report, the total program cost of Medicaid is projected to increase by 86% 
from $427.4 billion in FFY 2011 to $796 billion in FFY 2021 under the baseline scenario. However, it 
would grow to $830.9 billion in FFY 2021, under the full expansion scenario, which is nearly double—
an increase of 94.4%. The forecasted growth of the three scenarios are illustrated in the chart in 
Figure 2.17  
As is obvious from studying the previous two charts, the expansion 
population cannot explain the entire increase in the expenditure 
growth. The actuaries identified what they called the most important 
three causal factors: expansion of the eligible population, inflationary 
pressures within the health-care industry, and utilization. To quote 
from the report: “During 2012 through 2021, Medicaid expenditure 
growth is projected to be 6.4% per year on average, 1.1 percentage 
points higher than it would be if the Affordable Care Act impacts were 
excluded (5.3% average growth).”18  
                                                     
17  Ibid, p. 39. 
18  Ibid, p. 42. 
Figure 1: Projected Medicaid Enrollment – Millions of Persons 
According to the 2012 
USDHHS Actuarial Report 
the total program cost of 
Medicaid, if all states 
expand, is projected to 
nearly double from 
$427.4 billion in FFY 2011 
to $830.9 billion in FFY 
2021, an increase of 
94.4%. 
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While the projected growth may be startling to some, USDHHS actually lowered its forecast 
significantly from its 2011 report for the following reasons in order of importance: (1) states’ 
extensive efforts to lower costs and reduce payments in 2012 were greater than anticipated, and 
these reductions were incorporated into the forecast; (2) The actuarial report reduced its estimates 
on the number of states that would expand pursuant to the ACA; and (3) USDHHS is expecting slower 
overall healthcare expenditure growth.19  
The report further compares Medicaid growth to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), which is produced by the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and measures the total market values of all 
final goods and services produced within U.S. borders. Medicaid, 
both in federal and state resources, has been requiring steadily 
more economic resources over the years: in 1970, it represented 
0.5% of GDP; in 1980, 0.9%; in 1990, 1.2%; in 2000, 2.1%, and in 
                                                     
19  Ibid, pp. 44-45. 
Figure 2: Projected Medicaid Expenditures – in Billions of Dollars 
By 2020, Medicaid will 
reach 3.2% of GDP with 
only a partial expansion 
by the states 
representing 65% of the 
Medicaid population. 
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2011, 2.8%. The actuaries noted that even if only those states comprising 65% of the Medicaid 
population decide to expand that Medicaid will grow faster than GDP, and they predicted that by 
2020 it would comprise 3.2% of GDP, up from 2.8% in 2011. The report also noted that while 
Medicaid expenditures have declined somewhat from earlier projections, they are still projected to 
increase at an average annual rate of 6.4% per year through 2021. GDP, however, is anticipated to 
grow annually by only 5%. Even this assumption may be optimistic because GDP has not grown 
annually by 5% since prior to the 2007 recession. The chart shown in Figure 3 illustrates how 
Medicaid expenditures have been outpacing GDP.20   
                                                     
20  Ibid, p. 50. For 2013, health care spending growth is projected to remain under 4% because of the sluggish economic recovery, 
continued increases in cost-sharing requirements for the privately insured, and slower growth for Medicare and Medicaid 
spending. Starting in 2014, however, growth in national health spending will accelerate to 6.1%, reflecting expanded insurance 
coverage and growth through the ACA, through either Medicaid or the marketplaces. The use of medical services and goods, 
especially prescription drugs and physician and clinical services, among the newly insured is expected to contribute significantly 
to spending increases in Medicaid (12.2%) and private health insurance (7.7%). Out-of-pocket spending is projected to decline 
1.5% in 2014 due to the new coverage and lower cost sharing for those with improved coverage. C. Fleming. “US Health Spending 
Growth Projected to Average 5.8 Percent Annually Through 2022,” Health Affairs Blog online, September 18, 2013.  
Figure 3: Medicaid Expenditures as Share of GDP 
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Federal Budget Deficit and National Debt 
Forty-eight states, including Maine, have constitutional or 
statutory provisions requiring balanced budgets, and the two 
without such provisions have balanced their budgets in 
practice.21 The federal government, however, has no such 
constitutional restriction, and in practice it has not exercised 
the discipline to balance the budget on a consistent basis since 
the 1920’s, with two exceptions. From FFYs 1947 through 
1960, the federal government ran surpluses half the time and the aggregated surpluses nearly 
equaled the aggregated deficits. The second exception is a brief period from FFY 1998 through FFY 
2001 when the federal government ran surpluses.  
Although there is disagreement among economists on the effectiveness of deficit spending to 
stimulate the economy during recessionary times, economists do seem to agree on a number of 
other principles relating to deficits and debt. Economists, in general, are not against federal deficits 
or the national government assuming debt, provided (1) those deficits do not become the norm and 
(2) the magnitude of the debt remains manageable. They usually describe their concerns in terms 
of structural deficits, that is, when there is consistent deficit spending on an annual basis during 
good economic times and bad. They are not alarmed if the federal government carries debt, but 
they become concerned when that debt becomes so large relative to the economy that it begins to 
restrict fiscal flexibility and causes unwelcomed economic consequences. 
For example, most people can carry a debt load. They can afford to borrow money to buy a house 
and a car as long as they have adequate income to make loan payments. They can spend more in a 
year than they make, provided they manage their finances over their lifetime and make more money 
than they spend in other years. The federal government has a greater ability to carry debt and run 
deficits for at least two important reasons. First, it has no expected lifespan when all debt must be 
repaid, that is, when a person dies. Second, it has a number of tools available to it to maneuver 
financially that are not available to individuals, such as monetizing debt.  
Governments, however, can still overextend themselves, and they certainly do. On the first point of 
not allowing deficits to become the norm, it is commonly accepted that the federal government has 
a structural deficit problem.  
                                                     
21  Forty-three states have constitutional provisions relating to a balanced budget, five states have statutes but no constitutional 
provisions, and just two have neither. Of the two that have neither: Indiana may carry over annual deficits but cannot assume 
debt, which has the effect of forcing budgetary discipline; and Vermont, in practice, has not carried deficits from one budget year 
to the next. Restrictions relating to balanced budgets may be on the Governor when he introduces the budget (44 states), on the 
Legislature to pass a balanced budget (41 states), or on the Governor when he signs the budget (37 states). National Association 
of State Budget Officers, “Budget Processes in the States,” Summer 2008. 
Economists, in general, are not 
against federal deficits provided 
(1) those deficits do not become 
the norm and (2) the magnitude 
of the debt remains 
manageable.  
 Section II: Medicaid Finance and Outcomes – National Perspective 
 
 Page: 12 
Over the last fifty years, the federal government ran deficits ninety percent of the time, during good 
economic times and bad. In inflation adjusted dollars, the six of the ten largest federal deficits since 
1940 include FFYs 2008 through 2013, and five of those years hold the top five spots. As shown on 
the left half of the table in Figure 4, the largest federal budget ever was FFY 2009, which was -$1.5 
trillion when adjusted for inflation in 2013 dollars.22 Economists generally believe, however, that 
comparing magnitudes of inflation-adjusted deficits over time may be misleading because it does 
not account for the growth of the economy. Therefore, they like to compare deficits to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). As shown on the right half of the table in Figure 4, recent deficits are still 
enormously large. The top four years with the largest deficits were during trying times of World War 
II: 1942 through 1945. The next three years, however, are 2009, 2010, and 2011.   
On the second point, relating to having a national debt that is 
manageable, economists like to compare total national debt to GDP. 
Against this metric, the United States does not do well at all. For the 
second quarter of 2013, the debt-to-GDP ratio was 100.6%. Five 
years ago, the debt-to-GDP ratio was only 64.8%. This calculation 
uses both debt held by the public and by the government itself, 
which is known as intra-governmental debt. The latter debt consists 
of true obligations held by various government agencies, including 
the trust funds of Social Security and Medicare.  
                                                     
22  Data here and in the chart come from three sources: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2014 Historical Tables, 
Budget of the U.S. Government, Table 1.3; Congressional Budget Office, Monthly Budget Review—Summary for Fiscal Year 2013, 
November 7, 2013; and Gross Domestic Product data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. All values were converted to 
base FFY 2013 using GDP price deflators.  
It is commonly accepted 
that the federal 
government has a 
structural deficit problem. 
Over the last fifty years, 
the federal government 
ran deficits ninety percent 
of the time. 
Rank FFY
Inflation Adjusted
Billion Dollars
Base Year 2013
Rank FFY
Percent of 
GDP
1 2009 -1,517 1 1943 -30.3
2 2010 -1,373 2 1944 -22.7
3 2011 -1,351 3 1945 -21.5
4 2012 -1,104 4 1942 -14.2
5 2013 -680 5 2009 -10.1
6 1943 -632 6 2010 -9.0
7 1945 -625 7 2011 -8.7
8 1944 -596 8 1946 -7.2
9 2004 -509 9 2012 -7.0
10 2008 -494 10 1983 -6.0
Top 10 Largest Federal Deficits Since FFY 1940
Figure 4: Top 10 Largest Federal Deficits Ranked in Two Ways 
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A comparison of the United 
States to other countries 
also illustrates the point. If 
the United States were a 
member of the European 
Union, it would have the 
sixth worst debt-to-GDP 
ratio after Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and Belgium, as 
indicated in the table in Figure 5 which compares the second 
quarter of 2013, the most recent data available.23 Note on the list 
that the countries closest to the U.S. are countries struggling with 
serious economic problems. 
The history of Congressional actions to solve the continual deficit 
challenges, which have been mostly unsuccessful, is long and will not be covered here. However, it 
is important to know about recent attempts that may have an impact on future spending on 
Medicaid.  
First proposed by President Bill Clinton24 as part of his 1997 budget proposal, per capita caps would 
transform Medicaid’s financing mechanism by limiting each state to fixed dollar reimbursements for 
each recipient as opposed to the current method of paying for a percentage share of the costs. In 
essence, program spending growth would be linked to enrollment, not the overall cost of spending. 
Although per capita caps have been utilized in select Medicaid demonstration projects to ensure 
federal expenditures do not surpass a specified total, they have never been applied to the entire 
program. While per capita caps are typically proposed to save the federal government money, states 
would most likely have to make up the difference.25  
Different methodologies can be utilized in determining per capita caps. One method would establish 
a federal reimbursement limit per each recipient, and states would be responsible for any amount 
spent over that limit. Some methods would take into account the historic per-recipient Medicaid 
spending of the states, establishing limits on a state specific basis. Other methods would set up 
separate caps based on specific population groups.  
                                                     
23  EuroStat, European Union, Luxembourg, “Euro area and EU28 government debt up to 93.4%and 86.8% of GDP,” EuroStat News 
Release, 153/2013, October 23, 2013. U.S. Debt calculated using http://www.treasurydirect.gov/ website of the U.S. Department 
of Treasury. Accessed December 10, 2013. GDP data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
24  When the GOP-controlled Congress passed a Medicaid block grant bill in the late 1990s, President Clinton vetoed it and in 
response proposed his per capita cap method as a compromise. Under the President’s proposal, the caps would be calculated for 
spending on specific eligibility groups, such as individuals with disabilities, non-disabled adults, children, and the elderly.  
25  Edwin Park and Matt Broaddus, “Medicaid Per Capita Cap Would Shift Costs to States and Place Low-Income Beneficiaries at Risk,” 
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, October 4, 2012. 
Figure 5: Compare US Debt/ GDP 
Ratio to EU Countries 
 
Rank Country %
1 Greece 169.1
2 Italy 133.3
3 Portugal 131.3
4 Ireland 125.7
5 Belgium 105.0
United States 100.6
6 Cyprus 98.3
7 France 93.5
8 Spain 92.3
9 United Kingdom 89.6
10 Hungary 81.6
Government Debt to GDP 2013 Q2
Comparing US to EU Countries
If the United States were a 
member of the European Union, 
it would have the sixth worst 
debt-to-GDP ratio after Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and 
Belgium. 
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Although the implementation of per capita caps would provide states with stricter spending limits, 
typical proposals have allowed increased flexibility to avoid federal rules around cost sharing and 
the modification of benefits.  Flexibility with federal eligibility rules however, would most likely not 
be granted, thus assuring the continuation of historic caseload growth and a significant loss of 
federal dollars to states.26  
Congressman Bill Cassidy from Louisiana provides a recent 
example of how this cost saving initiative continues to resurface 
when in 2012 he proposed to equalize Medicaid spending across 
all states with a per capita cap that varied by Medicaid 
category.27 His proposal called for per capita caps that differed 
for eligibility groups, such as children, adults, the blind and 
individuals with disabilities, and elderly individuals receiving 
long-term care services, based on the median cost of care.28 
Payments under his proposal would be “risk adjusted for the population as well as down to the 
recipient.”29 More recently, on May 1, 2013, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Representative Fred 
Upton (R-Mich.) made public a plan for “Making Medicaid Work”.  One of their blueprint’s key 
proposals was to implement per capita caps.30 
Historically, times of federal financial crises have been the main rationale for imposing per capita 
caps. Certain policymakers, however, believe that in addition to saving money, they would improve 
care. Although no per capita cap proposal has been implemented across the entire program to date, 
the growing federal budget deficit—as well as a fundamental belief by certain policymakers that 
caps incentivize improved outcomes—makes certain that per capita caps will continue to be offered 
as a solution to the current fiscal challenges faced by the federal government. 
In 2011, debate over raising the debt ceiling of the federal government led to a compromise. In 
exchange for raising the ceiling, Congress created a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction with 
the enactment of the Budget Control Act of 2011. The Select Committee was charged with 
                                                     
26  Even though per capita caps normally impose a limitation on state flexibility to make significant changes to the system, it is 
possible (although not probable) that Congress could amend federal law to allow modifications to enrollment and eligibility.  
27 Bill Cassidy, “Cassidy Eyes Per Capita Caps For States As Part Of Medicaid Reform Proposal,” Inside Health Policy, March 6, 2012, 
accessed at: http://insidehealthpolicy.com/Inside-Health-General/Public-Content/cassidy-eyes-per-capita-caps-for-states-as-
part-of-medicaid-reform-proposal/menu-id-869.html   
28  Critics of per capita caps have argued that they do not take into consideration unanticipated health care cost growth or future 
demographic changes. 
29 Idem. Also, Congressman Cassidy claimed that under his proposal the money would follow the patient and produce better 
outcomes.  
30  Senators Fred Upton and Orin Hatch, “Making Medicaid Work: Protect the Vulnerable, Offer Individualized Care, and Reduce 
Costs,” May 1, 2013, accessed at: 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/analysis/20130501Medicaid.pdf 
Although Medicaid was 
exempted in the 2011 Deficit 
Reduction plans, there is no 
guarantee that Congress will 
be able to exempt Medicaid 
from budget cuts in the 
future. 
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developing and proposing a bipartisan budget to reduce the budget by $1.5 trillion over ten years.  
If the Select Committee failed by January 15, 2012, to have legislation enacted that would achieve 
a $1.2 trillion deficit reduction, the Act triggered automatic reductions in defense and other 
discretionary spending spread evenly over FFYs 2013 through 2021, also known as “sequestration.” 
The Act exempted Medicaid from the automatic spending cuts. The Select Committee failed, 
triggering the automatic spending cuts.31 With the help of sequestration, the current federal deficit 
in FFY 2013 was reduced to $680 billion, which was the first time it fell below $1 trillion since FFY 
2008. However, FFY 2013 is still the fifth largest budget deficit in inflation-adjusted dollars since 
1940, and the 18th in terms of a percent of GDP.  
Although Medicaid was exempted in the 2011 Act, there is no guarantee that Congress will be able 
to continue exempting Medicaid from budget cuts in the future. Medicaid competes against other 
priorities also considered to be very important, including Medicare, federal pensions, veteran 
benefits, food assistance, and housing. Additionally, the continued cost escalation brings even 
greater attention to Medicaid.   
Figure 632 for example, lists Medicaid as having the highest percentage increase in expenditure 
growth of all major budgetary categories for both FFYs 2012 and 2013. Considering that the national 
debt grew at 5.4% from December 2012 to December 2013 while GDP has only grown 3.3% (or 1.8% 
                                                     
31  The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, which was passed on January 1, 2013, delayed sequestration from January 2, 2013, 
until March 1, 2013. 
32  Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Monthly Budget Review, November 7, 2013. 
Figure 6: Total Outlays from Federal Government 2011-2013 
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if you adjust for inflation), the national debt continues to 
grow faster than GDP, placing pressure on Congress to act 
on the deficit problem.  
The numbers alone call attention to the Medicaid program, 
and the solution from the point of view of the federal 
government is obvious. Federal deficits continue to mount, 
adding to the national debt at a faster rate than GDP 
growth, and Medicaid is the fastest growing budget category. Just recently, the Congressional 
Budget Office suggested an option to impose a cap on federal Medicaid spending to help bring the 
federal deficit problem under control.   
In November 2013, the Congressional Budget Office published the report Options for Reducing the 
Deficit: 2014 to 2023, and the very first option listed under the category of health is capping 
Medicaid spending. 
The report points out that “CBO expects federal Medicaid to grow at a higher rate over the next 
decade, an average of 8% a year.” Note that this forecast is almost two percentage points higher 
than the forecast by the USDHHS’s Office of the Actuary covered earlier in this section. The quote 
below is from the CBO report. 
“Lawmakers could make various structural changes to Medicaid to decrease federal 
spending for the program. Those changes include reducing the scope of covered 
services, eliminating eligibility categories, repealing the Medicaid expansion due to 
start in 2014, lowering the federal government’s share of total Medicaid spending, 
or capping the amount that each state receives from the federal government to 
operate the program.”33  
The report discusses in great length the pros and cons with specific recommendations on ways to 
cut back on Medicaid spending. One obvious way would be to reduce FMAPs. Clearly, there is risk 
that Congress may shift more costs of Medicaid to the states, and Section VI of this report will 
address that risk more fully.34  
  
                                                     
33  Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2014 to 2023, November 2013. 
34  Especially when one considers that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion funding is at 90% to 100%, it would be hard pressed for any 
Congress or President to increase funding. The only way to move at this point would be to reduce funding. 
The November 2013 Congressional 
Budget Office Report states that 
Medicaid is expected to grow at an 
average rate of 8% over the next 
decade, nearly 2 percentage points 
higher than the USDHHS’ Actuarial 
Report.. 
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Perspective from the States 
Health care and its ancillary support services are the largest items in states’ budgets, and it is 
noteworthy that one of the conclusions of the official actuarial report on Medicaid involves the 
budgets of the states: 
“Despite the amount of time that has passed since the end of the recession, some of 
its effects on Medicaid still remain. Enrollment is projected to have grown more 
quickly than the U.S. population in 2012, albeit at slower rates than in recent years. 
The expiration of the temporary Federal matching rate increases led to substantial 
increases in State Medicaid expenditures, but States’ budget revenues have not kept 
pace; these conflicting trends appear to have been a significant reason for the 
relatively slow rate of Medicaid expenditure growth in 2012.” 35 
As can be expected, Medicaid expenditures have been a 
major concern of the states. The National Association of 
State Budget Officers (NASBO) produces periodic 
information on the fiscal situation of the states, and 
Medicaid has played a central role in those publications. 
The most recent State Expenditure Report, published in 
November 2013, shows that once again Medicaid is the 
largest component of states’ total budgets (consisting of 
all funds, including federal funds), comprising on average 24.5%, i.e., almost one in every four dollars 
that a state spends goes to Medicaid. The growth has been steady over time. In 1990, Medicaid 
surpassed higher education as the second largest state program, and in 2003 it surpassed 
elementary and secondary education (basic education) to become the largest program. For the next 
several years, basic education and Medicaid traded places, but now Medicaid holds a substantial 
lead over basic education: 24.5% versus 20.0%.36  
                                                     
35  2012 Actuarial Report on the Financial Outlook for Medicaid, p. 52. 
36  The growth of the Medicaid program and its crowding out of other important priorities has been a major concern for most 
governors, democrat and republican. As recently as 2012, Montana Governor Brian Schweitzer, a Democrat, told the Washington 
Post that, "unlike the federal government, Montana can't just print money. We have a budget surplus, and we're going to keep it 
that way." See N.C. Aizenman and Karen Tumulty, “Democrats Share Concerns over Medicaid Expansion,” Washington Post, July 
13, 2012, p. A3. 
According to the National 
Association of State Budget Officers 
(NASBO), in 2003 Medicaid 
surpassed elementary and 
secondary education (basic 
education) to become the largest 
state budgetary Program.  
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Figure 7 is a chart that compares Maine’s spending (includes all funds) to the national average. 
Maine’s spending pattern preceded the national pattern by more than ten years. Medicaid overtook 
basic education spending as a percentage of the total budget in 1992 for Maine. For State Fiscal Year 
(SFY) 2012-13, Medicaid spending was 32.2% of the budget, nearly double the 16.6% for basic 
education. 
Using estimated NASBO data showing all funds 
for SFY 2013, Maine ranks low in basic education 
expenditures as a percentage of the total state 
budget and very high in Medicaid expenditures 
as a percentage of the total state budget 
compared to other states. (See Figures 8, 9, and 
10.)37 
Figure 8 also shows the top five states for each of 
these categories and provides the rankings for 
Maine, New Hampshire, and the state average. 
Vermont spends the most of any state on basic 
education at 32.5%, followed by Indiana at 
31.3%.  
                                                     
37 National Association of State Budget Officers, State Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal 2011–2013 State Spending. 2013. 
Figure 8: State Ranks for Spending on Basic Education / 
Medicaid 
    State and Rank %     State and Rank %
1. Vermont 33 1. Missouri 36
2. Indiana 31 2. Pennsylvania 34
3. Georgia 31 3. Maine 32
4. Minnesota 27 4. Arizona 32
5. Texas 27 5. Indiana 32
13. New Hampshire 23 15. New Hampshire 26
State average 19 State average 23
31. Maine 17
Education
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Figure 7: Major Expenditures Categories as Percent of Maine's Budget - All State and 
Federal Funds 
 Section II: Medicaid Finance and Outcomes – National Perspective 
 
 Page: 19 
New Hampshire ranks 13th at 23.3%. The state average is 19.4%. 
Maine ranks 31st at 16.6%. For Medicaid, Maine has the third 
highest expenditure at 32.2%, after Missouri and Pennsylvania. 
New Hampshire is 15th at 25.6% and the state average is 22.8%. 
The crowding out of state spending for K-12 education, both 
nationally and state-by-state, may help explain why there have 
been only marginal gains in educational outcomes since the 1970s, 
when the upward trend in high-school graduation rates of the 20th century — a pattern that had 
helped to fuel worker productivity and economic growth — came to a halt. Although Maine, like 
other states, has experienced an increase in high-school graduation rates since 2005, the recent 
uptick represents mostly a return to the baseline of 40 years ago. At the same time, Maine has seen 
significant declines in the mean SAT scores, both reading and math, of college-bound high-school 
seniors, since the mid-1990s, according to data from the National Assessment of Educational 
Progress.38  
  
                                                     
38  National Center for Educational Statistics, Digest of Educational Statistics, Table 174, accessed at: 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d12/tables/dt12_174.asp. 
Maine ranks low in basic 
education expenditures as 
a percentage of the total 
state budget and very high 
in Medicaid expenditures 
as a percentage of the 
total state budget 
compared to other states.  
 
Figure 9: Comparing Maine Total Expenditures on MaineCare and K-12 Education 
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Public safety and corrections are two other priority areas where states are struggling to maintain 
funding. Decreased budgets for police can result in less crimes being solved, if not higher crime 
rates, due to reductions in manpower and other resources. Decreased budgets for corrections have 
not only resulted in reduced staffing, raising safety concerns for correctional officers, but have also 
forced some states to release prisoners early. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in May 
2011 that California had to reduce its prison population by 32,000 over two years because its 
overcrowding problem violated the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.39 Yet putting 
violent offenders back on the street poses clear dangers to the public. While Maine has experienced 
a decline in rates of “index crime,” meaning the most serious and commonly reported crimes, it has 
nonetheless experienced sharp jumps in rates of rape, domestic violence, and especially drug-
related crime. Moreover, offender recidivism rates are rising. According to the Maine Statistical 
Analysis Center, a function of the University of Southern Maine’s Muskie School of Public Service, 
arrests for drug-abuse violations have increased dramatically in the past 25 years. As a percentage 
of all arrests in Maine, drug arrests have jumped from more than 4% in 1986 to nearly 11% in 2010. 
  
                                                     
39  Brown, Governor of California, et al. v. Plata et al. 
Figure 10: National Average of State Expenditures on Medicaid and K-12 Education 
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Less Funds for Vulnerable Populations 
Previous caseload expansions and burgeoning costs have also placed a strain on the capacity of the 
Medicaid programs to serve the most vulnerable populations, as partially evidenced by waiting lists. 
At a time when a number of states are moving increased numbers of healthy adults of working age 
onto the Medicaid rolls, a number of state Medicaid programs possess waiting lists for current 
programs serving the neediest population groups. These services, provided mainly through Section 
1915(c) home and community based (HCBS) waivers,40 generally serve vulnerable populations that 
require more intense services and supports, such as individuals with intellectual disabilities or the 
elderly, to avoid institutional care.41 A 2011 Kaiser Foundation report showed the wait list for 
Maine’s 1915(c) waiver programs to be almost two thousand while other New England States had a 
lower number of citizens awaiting services. Some other states had no wait lists at the time of the 
study.42 Pennsylvania was the closest state geographically with a wait list that exceeded Maine at 
the time of the study, and there were twenty-two states in the report with wait list populations less 
than that of Maine.43 By electing to change the purpose of Medicaid from a program to serve 
vulnerable populations to one that serves everyone below a fixed income level, “expanding” states 
seem to be giving little consideration of how to handle the populations that have had to endure 
waiting lists. These populations represent, in most cases, individuals who cannot be easily served 
through commercial health plans, unlike the expanded population. 
Inadequate Payment to Providers  
In addition to the issue of wait lists, many states are concerned about their ability to maintain 
existing service levels or to provide for those entering the Medicaid program. Maine like all states, 
struggles to pay physicians adequately. For every dollar that private insurers pay a physician, 
                                                     
40  The 1915(c) waivers are one of many options available to states to allow the provision of long term care services in home and 
community based settings under the Medicaid Program. States can offer a variety of services under an HCBS waiver program. 
Programs can provide a combination of standard medical services and non-medical services. Standard services include but are 
not limited to: case management (i.e., supports and service coordination), homemaker, home health aide, personal care, adult 
day health services, habilitation (both day and residential), and respite care. States can also propose “other” types of services 
that may assist in diverting and/or transitioning individuals from institutional settings into their homes and community. See 
www.Medicaid.gov. 
41  Medicaid is a lifeline for most people with significant disabilities who have greater medical needs and often require assistance 
with activities of daily living throughout their lifetimes, such as getting dressed, taking medication, preparing meals, and managing 
money. Medicaid is overwhelmingly the largest funding source of both acute health care and long term services and supports 
since people with disabilities who are covered by Medicaid generally do not have access to employer based or other private 
coverage. 
42  According to the Kaiser 2011 State Health Facts on Waiting Lists, due to the limited number of HCBS slots in states, there are over 
500,000 people on waiting lists for services, over 300,000 of whom are disabled. The wait can be as long as 8-10 years. This crisis 
results in unnecessary, unwanted and costly institutional care; family members being forced to quit jobs or take on second jobs 
to help care for their loved one; and families having to leave their loved ones unattended or in the care of unqualified persons.  
43  For the 2014-2015 biennial budget, the LePage Administration and the state legislature committed $27.3 million in total funds 
(state and federal) to reduce the waiting list for services for individuals with intellectual disabilities. This included $5.0 million and 
$5.4 million of general funds in SFY 2014 and SFY 2015, respectively.  Even with that commitment, Maine still has 1,328 individuals 
awaiting services.  
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MaineCare pays 42 cents on the dollar, the second lowest in New England. (See Figure 11.)44  
In an attempt to address some of these issues, the ACA required certain changes to provider rate 
structures. The ACA mandated that Medicaid reimbursement rates to physicians in family Medicaid, 
general internal medicine, pediatric medicine, and subspecialties who provide primary care services 
be raised to 100% of Medicare rates but only through calendar year 2014. Other parts of the ACA 
provide increased funding to safety-net providers that serve low-income individuals and families. 
This occurred at a time when most states were struggling with revenue slumps due to the recession 
and because of budget deficiencies were cutting reimbursement rates, not increasing them.  
Despite these increases in rates, many reports, including one from 
the nonpartisan economic and social research group Urban 
Institute,45 noted that most states believed that the temporary 
rate increase would have little effect on attracting new physicians 
willing to accept new Medicaid patients but believed it would help 
maintain provider participation in the short term. 
The same report noted that the rate increases are estimated to 
                                                     
44 Avik Roy, “How Do Blue States Expand Medicaid? By Paying Doctors,” Forbes, accessed December 1, 2013, at: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2012/07/23/how-do-blue-states-expand-medicaid-by-paying-doctors-less/. 
45 Ian Hill, “Will There Be Enough Providers to Meet the Need? Provider Capacity and the ACA,” The Urban Institute, November 
2012. http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412699-Will-There-Be-Enough-Providers-to-Meet-the-Need.pdf. See also Institute, 
“Hard Question on Access to Healthcare – Will we have enough Doctors?” Urban 
http://www.urban.org/issues/hardquestions/accesstohealthcare.cfm, accessed December 10, 2013. 
Figure 11: Cents on the Dollar Medicaid Pays Relative to Private Insurers by State 
Maine struggles to pay 
physicians adequately. For 
every dollar that private 
insurers pay a physician, 
MaineCare pays 42 cents 
on the dollar, the second 
lowest in New England.  
 Section II: Medicaid Finance and Outcomes – National Perspective 
 
 Page: 23 
increase provider participation by 11%, which would not be sufficient enough to cover the current 
existing shortage much less the additional caseloads as a result of mandatory increases.46 
HealthPocket, Inc., released a survey that was conducted on more than 1 million health care 
professions, noting only 43% were listed as accepting Medicaid. Consequently, while 75% of Maine 
doctors may be willing to accept new Medicaid patients, another 10% are expected to drop Medicaid 
patients in the coming months.47   
The lack of a sufficient number of providers is also affected 
by policy and regulation. As with many large government 
agencies, Medicaid’s continuously growing bureaucratic 
and regulatory structure has typically become difficult to 
manage and is outmoded.48 States that want to define goals 
differently from federal standards or try innovative 
approaches are required to seek federal approval in the 
form of waivers. The subsequent result for many states has 
become a cumbersome set of rules and different services (and service definitions) that do not 
comport or transition across the many operating waivers.  They can also be difficult to navigate, 
manage, and monitor, and most of the time have very little to do with improved overall health 
outcomes. Unfortunately, because the administration and operation of Medicaid has become so 
overly burdensome and complex, the very people who the system is supposed to serve can become 
harmed in the process by receiving inadequate or poor quality care. Additional evidence of the 
cumbersome structure is demonstrated by the years some states wait to obtain waivers and the 
inability of the current federal administration to implement several major policy measures of the 
ACA in January 2013, like issuing guidance on how states were to implement a new coverage option 
called the “basic health program” aimed at helping low and middle income families who did not 
qualify for Medicaid gain coverage. 
Federal Bias for Institutional Care 
Federal Medicaid regulations still favor costly institutional care for individuals with disabilities and 
the elderly when less expensive community and home-based options would serve these individuals 
more appropriately. Currently, close to 60% of Medicaid’s long term care funding goes to 
institutional care.49 This federal bias towards institutional care is due to the fact that nursing home 
                                                     
46 HealthPocket, “With Expansion Looming, Less than Half of Physicians Accept Medicaid,” 
http://www.healthpocket.com/healthcare-research/infostat/less-than-half-of-physicians-accept-medicaid, accessed December 
10, 2013. 
47  Health Affairs, August 2012, vol. 31, no. 8, pp. 1673-1679. 
48  President Obama recently stated in an MSNBC interview with Chris Matthews that “we have these big agencies, some of which 
are outdated, some of which are not designed properly,” accessed at: http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=048D0521-
3FDE-4793-9939-7BEBAACB1C67. 
49  Strides have been made over the past 15 years to change the institutional bias in Medicaid, however, the labyrinth of burdensome 
As with many large government 
agencies, Medicaid’s continuously 
growing bureaucratic and 
regulatory structure has typically 
become cumbersome and archaic 
with a myriad of disparate rules and 
regulations across populations. 
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services are mandatory for states, while HCBS are optional. 
States currently have two main options to fund HCBS 
through Medicaid – the HCBS waiver (Section 1915(c)) or the 
HCBS state plan option (Section 1915(i)). The 1915(c) waiver 
is only available to individuals who qualify for an 
institutional level of care. Under this waiver, states can cap 
the number of eligible people, maintain waiting lists, and 
limit services to certain geographic areas. Additionally, 
states must apply for renewal of the waiver from Medicaid, 
which is a burdensome and lengthy process. The 1915(i) state plan option, on the other hand, allows 
states to have eligibility that is below the institutional level of care before people need nursing home 
care.50 
Maine offers a number of different Medicaid services for HCBS. In addition to mandatory and 
optional Medicaid State Plan services, there are currently six approved home and community based 
waivers that serve elders, adults with physical and intellectual disabilities, and children, including 
one recently received approved specific to adults who have experienced Cerebral Palsy, Seizure 
Disorders, or other conditions during their first 21 years of life causing significant disabilities 
(referred to as “Other Related Conditions”). The Maine Department of Health and Human Services 
(MDHHS) is also currently designing and submitting a waiver to serve individuals with acquired brain 
injury in future years.51 Further, MDHHS together with legislative support is in the midst of 
attempting to remediate and simplify the complex operational long term care system that has been 
institutionalized in the department over the past 30 years or more. Although the MDHHS has begun 
to fix the system and with it properly allocate funds across 
populations to begin addressing the impending aging of 
the population and the complexities that go along with it, 
major structural reforms are still necessary to the current 
enterprise to create fiscal stability and sustainability so 
that the current and future needs of people with chronic 
and co-occurring long term support and service needs are 
met with quality and dignity.   
                                                     
federal rules and regulations and the tedious waiver and state plan amendment process have made the undertaking of balancing 
the system and implementing appropriate care settings inconvenient and administratively burdensome for states. 
50  The Affordable Care Act does provide a new state plan option to provide home and community-based services in Medicaid 
Section, 1915(k).  Also, as of April 2010, the 1915(i) state plan option no longer allows states to cap the number of eligible people, 
keep waiting lists, and limit services to certain geographic areas.  They may target services to certain population groups. 
51  See MDHHS’s Balancing Incentive Payment Program Application, May 2013, accessed at: http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-
CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Long-Term-Services-and-Support/Balancing/Downloads/Maine-BIP.pdf. 
Federal regulations favor costly 
institutional care when less 
expensive community and home-
based options would serve 
recipients more appropriately.  
Close to 60% of Medicaid’s long 
term care funding goes to 
institutional care. 
MDHHS together with legislative 
support is in the midst of attempting 
to remediate and simplify the 
complex operational long term care 
system that has been 
institutionalized in the department 
over the past 30 years or more. 
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Having recently received a grant called the Balancing Incentives Program Grant (BIP), Maine 
undertook a major initiative that includes the following:  
 
 Working with community partners and stakeholders in a collaborative fashion to achieve the 
goals of increasing home and community based supports,  
 Building upon the supports that Maine currently has in place to create a “No Wrong 
Door/Single Entry Point” system,  
 Developing statewide core standardized assessments, and  
 Creating a conflict-free case management system.  
This grant will complement other ongoing initiatives in Maine aimed at system reform and 
rebalancing long-term services and supports (LTSS) towards community living.  
Despite the inclusion of these and other incremental changes to MaineCare over the years and the 
current work of the LePage Administration to bolster home and community based services and 
balance the system, the federal bias toward institutional care remains. Because MDHHS’ operational 
resources are severely limited, it would seem proper that MaineCare continue to focus on creating 
and implementing structural reforms, which are designed to offer more appropriate care settings 
for elderly and vulnerable populations and which will improve the quality of care for all recipients 
through current and future federal partnerships like BIP, without having the additional burden of 
taking on new populations via the ACA at the current time. 
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Section III: Summary of States’ Experience with Expansion 
Initial Eligibility Determination Challenges 
According to the most recent information available, twenty-two states are not expanding eligibility 
for Medicaid, three states are currently undecided, and twenty-five states are expanding eligibility 
in some form or another.  
From an operational perspective, states that are relying on a federally administered health care 
exchange, which includes Maine, are experiencing serious challenges with determining eligibility. 
The USA Today recently reported that the:  
“federal health care exchange is incorrectly determining that some people are 
eligible for Medicaid when they clearly are not, leaving them with little chance to 
get the subsidized insurance they are entitled to as the Dec. 23 deadline for 
enrollment approaches.  When consumers applying for insurance put their income 
information into subsidy calculators on HealthCare.gov — the exchange handling 
insurance sales for 36 states — it tells them how much financial assistance they 
qualify for or that they are eligible for Medicaid. If it's the latter, consumers aren't 
able to obtain subsidies toward the insurance, although they could buy full-priced 
plans.” 52 
The article also reported that people making as much as 
$80,000 a year are being told that they qualify for Medicaid 
on the federal site www.HealthCare.gov.53    
According to the ACA, regardless of state decisions to expand 
Medicaid, all states must implement new streamlined 
eligibility enrollment processes.54 These processes are 
designed to align eligibility determinations for Medicaid, CHIP, and premium tax credits in the 
marketplace. These new systems will use data sharing, drawing from various state and Federal data 
records, to populate and verify information on Medicaid applications and re-certifications. If 
executed properly, this will provide states with the ability to make real-time eligibility and 
enrollment determinations, and mitigate the need for applicants to provide in-person paperwork to 
                                                     
52  Jayne O’Donnell. “Federal exchange sends unqualified people to Medicaid,” USA Today, December 9, 2013.   
53  Idem. 
54   Although the federal government is providing time-limited 90% federal funding to support system development, state costs can 
still be significant depending upon the amount of upgrading necessary. The effectiveness of the new system will depend upon 
states’ ability to implement it successfully. Implementation will demand the following: significant changes to policy; 
comprehensive enhancements, if not full replacements, of state information technology systems; the making of new application 
and enrollment materials; the establishment of new outreach methods; the potential reorganization of state eligibility employees; 
and unprecedented coordination between organizations and entities. 
 “.. the federal health care 
exchange is incorrectly determining 
that some people are eligible for 
Medicaid when they clearly are 
not.”  USA TODAY. 
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verify information provided to the state on their applications. The challenge for many states is that 
they do not possess a sophisticated enough system able to handle the type of volume.  Maine is 
included among those states.55 
Medicaid Realizes Largest Increases with the ACA 
States are reporting higher enrollment in Medicaid than in 
private insurance since the Affordable Care Act exchanges 
opened October 1, 2013. A new report released by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services on December 3, 2013 reveals 
that close to 1.5 million people were determined eligible in the 
month of October to enroll in Medicaid or the Children's Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP).  
As one example, in the state of Washington, in the first two 
months of enrollment, the state's health-care exchange —
Healthplanfinder— enrolled 176,468 Washingtonians in coverage. Over 91,000 are newly eligible 
for expanded Medicaid. More than 65,900 were currently eligible but were not enrolled, which left 
only 18,000 plus residents who purchased private policies.56 
The number of applications for Medicaid has increased under the Affordable Care Act, with growth 
more substantial in states that have decided to expand Medicaid. In states that are not expanding 
Medicaid, applications to Medicaid and CHIP increased 4.1% in October over the previous few 
months, and the total number of individuals determined to be eligible for Medicaid or CHIP was 
697,019. In expansion states, applications jumped 15.5%, and 757,991 new eligibility 
determinations were made. The total across all states was an 8.6% increase in applications and 
1,460,367 new eligibility determinations.57  
                                                     
55  Eligibility systems and staff are already enormously burdened.  For example Illinois, a state with a sizeable Medicaid program, is 
just one state that is experiencing problems trying to remove ineligibles from their welfare system rolls.  In fact, the early findings 
of an ongoing review of the Illinois Medicaid program revealed that half the people enrolled were not even eligible. A review of 
the Illinois Medicaid program confirms massive waste and fraud. A review was ordered more than a year ago-- because of 
concerns about waste and abuse. So far, the state says reviewers have examined roughly 712,000 people enrolled in Medicaid, 
and found that 357,000, or about half of them shouldn't have received benefits. After further review, the state decided that the 
percentage of people who didn't qualify was actually about one out of four. "It says that we've had a system that is dysfunctional. 
Once people got on the rolls, there wasn't the will or the means to get them off,” said (state) Senator Bill Haines of Alton. A state 
spokesman insists that the percentage of unqualified recipients will continue to drop dramatically as the review continues 
because the beginning of the process focused on the people that were most likely to be unqualified for those benefits. Ted 
Dabrowski, Vice-President of The Illinois Policy Institute think tank, spoke with News 4 via SKYPE. He said the Medicaid review 
found two out of three recipients either got the wrong benefits, or didn't deserve any at all. “We added so many people to 
Medicaid rolls so quickly, we've lost control of who belongs there,” said Dabrowski.  But regardless of how it ends, critics say it is 
proof that Illinois has done a poor job of protecting tax payers’ money, adapted from Channel 4 KMOV.com, St. Louis, accessed 
at: http://www.kmov.com/news/just-posted/Audit-reveals-half-of-people-enrolled-in-IL-Medicaid-program-not-eligible-230586321.html. 
56  Washington Signing Up More People for Medicaid than Private Plans.  Catholic Online.  December 6, 2013. 
57  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.  Medicaid and CHIP: October Monthly Applications and Eligibility Determinations,               
States are reporting higher 
enrollment in Medicaid than 
in private insurance since the 
Affordable Care Act 
exchanges opened October 1, 
2013.  The growth is more 
substantial in states that 
have decided to expand 
Medicaid. 
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Selected State Highlights of Recent Activity58 
Expansion states are already seeing a large number of individuals enrolled in Medicaid. Many of 
these individuals are prequalified for expanded Medicaid because they are already enrolled in other 
entitlement programs such as food stamps.59 For example, in Oregon, 70,000 residents have 
enrolled as a result of aggressive outreach campaigns to those who receive food stamps in the state. 
Other states have followed similar advertisement campaigns with varied success.   
Arizona: The number of new applications is not available at this time. In total, Arizona expects 
57,000 people to qualify for its expanded Medicaid program. In addition, the state expects 240,000 
more individuals to enroll in its existing Medicaid program for childless adults with incomes at or 
below the federal poverty level. Enrollment in that program was frozen in 2012 at 70,000. 
Arkansas: Arkansas elected to expand its Medicaid program from 17% of FPL to 138% of FPL.60 
Arkansas has received 70,595 applications for its expanded Medicaid program. Of those, 3,672 came 
through the state's existing Medicaid website, 1,785 were paper or phone applications, and the rest 
were positive responses to a mailing to 132,000 households that receive food stamps. Ultimately, 
the state expects about 250,000 uninsured residents to qualify for Medicaid.61   
California: Newly eligible enrollment in expanded Medicaid is expected to total about 1.4 million. 
Of that number, 600,000 people will come from the state's early expansion program approved by 
the federal government in 2011.  
Colorado: Colorado has qualified more than 25,000 adults for its expanded Medicaid program. Of 
that number, approximately 9,000 were on a waiting list for an existing Medicaid program that 
covers adults with extremely low incomes. Another 10,000 people enrolled in that program will also 
be transferred to expanded Medicaid coverage in January. Combined, that comes to 35,000 
individuals, more than 20% of the 160,000 uninsured residents Colorado expects to be eligible for 
its expanded Medicaid program. 
                                                     
-December 3, 2013. 
58  Most information modified from Pewstates.org information on the states. 
59  Expediting the eligibility process does not necessarily translate into program integrity. 
60  States like Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont already possessed expanded populations prior the ACA whereas states like 
Arkansas did not. 
61  Arkansas is one of the first states to use a new tool for facilitating expedited Medicaid enrollment. The state is using information 
it already had on hand – such as Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) income data– to conduct an expedited 
(express) “administrative transfers” to Medicaid. To implement the strategy, Arkansas sent letters to SNAP participants letting 
them know they are potentially eligible for Medicaid and inviting them to enroll by responding to the letter. To enroll, the person 
returns a simple form and the state conducts additional data checks, as appropriate. Since the state began sending letters in 
early September, Arkansas reports that 63,465 individuals have been “fast tracked” into Medicaid with little wait. During the 
same period of time, the state also found 3,000 unenrolled children who are eligible for ARKids First, the state’s Medicaid and 
CHIP programs. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicaid and CHIP: October Monthly Applications and Eligibility 
Determinations, December 3, 2013, p. 3. 
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Connecticut: Connecticut has enrolled 3,550 new people in its expanded Medicaid program through 
its state-run exchange and Medicaid website. In addition, at least 48,000 enrolled in a state-run low 
income-health program have already been moved into expanded Medicaid. Connecticut expects a 
total of 55,000 expanded Medicaid enrollees in 2014. 
Delaware: No new enrollment data is available yet. Delaware already provides Medicaid coverage 
for 30,000 adults with incomes up to the federal poverty level ($11,490). Its expanded Medicaid 
program is expected to cover another 30,000 people with incomes between $11,490 and 138% of 
the federal poverty level ($15,856). 
District of Columbia: D.C. began expanding its Medicaid program in June 2010. By June 2013, nearly 
50,000 new people were enrolled. The District has not estimated how many people will ultimately 
enroll in expanded Medicaid. 
Hawaii: Hawaii has approved 6,100 applications for expanded Medicaid. By 2014, the state expects 
a total of 54,000 enrollees. 
Illinois: The Illinois Medicaid agency has received 30,124 applications for expanded Medicaid 
through its existing website. Illinois has an exchange partnership with the federal government so 
applications are also being filed on the federally-run exchange. In addition to online applications, 
46,000 people responded to an August mailing to 123,000 food stamp recipients. Illinois has enrolled 
26,000 of those respondents and is processing the balance. In addition, 100,000 people in Cook 
County who participated in a limited early Medicaid expansion enrollment group will automatically 
be rolled over to the expansion program on January 1, 2014. Projected enrollment is 342,000. 
Iowa: No new numbers are available on Medicaid applications. In all, 150,000 uninsured Iowans are 
expected to qualify under the proposed expansion. About 63,000 residents with incomes up to 200% 
of the federal poverty level ($22,980) are currently enrolled in a Medicaid health plan with limited 
benefits. Most are expected to qualify for expanded Medicaid. Iowa has not yet received federal 
approval for its Medicaid expansion plan, which is similar to Arkansas' so-called private option. 
Iowa’s Medicaid expansion was recently granted partial approval on December 10, 2013. 
Kentucky: Kentucky has received 25,654 applications for expanded Medicaid through its state-run 
exchange. Ultimately, the state expects 308,000 low-income individuals to qualify. 
Maryland: The number of applications from its state-run website is not yet available. However, 
Maryland has an existing, limited-benefit health plan known as Primary Adult Care (PAC) available 
to all adults with incomes up to 123% of the federal poverty level ($14,133). As of September 30, 
enrollment in the plan was 82,423. Maryland expects enrollment in PAC to expand to 88,000 by 
January 1, 2014, when the entire PAC population will automatically convert to full Medicaid benefits. 
In addition, residents in a narrow income band (124% to 138% of poverty) can sign up for expanded 
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Medicaid on the state exchange. Overall, Maryland expects 110,000 people to be enrolled by the 
end of 2014. 
Massachusetts: No enrollment numbers are available at this time. As a result of its own health care 
reforms launched in 2006, Massachusetts has a 97% insured rate. Still, the state expects about 
45,000 people to obtain Medicaid coverage as a result of the expansion. 
Michigan: No enrollment numbers are available. The Michigan legislature approved Republican 
Governor Rick Snyder's proposed Medicaid expansion in September but postponed implementation 
until April 2014. 
Minnesota: The federal government granted Minnesota special permission to enroll 84,000 
individuals in the expanded Medicaid program in 2011. Another 2,496 newly eligible Medicaid 
members completed applications on the state-run exchange in the first two weeks of October. 
Ultimately, Minnesota expects to cover 265,000 adults in its expansion. In addition, it is the only 
state that has opted to provide a so-called "Basic Health Plan" for people with incomes up to 200% 
of the federal poverty line ($22,980). Under the ACA, the federal government will pay 85% of the 
costs starting in 2015. That program is expected to grow to 160,000. 
New Hampshire: The Governor called a special session to consider Medicaid Expansion and on 
November 21, 2013, Special House Bill 1 to expand Medicaid, approved by the House early in the 
day, was rejected by the Senate. However, spokespersons for both parties have stated that 
negotiations would continue in the 2014 general session. They expressed interest in considering bills 
that include provisions to use federal Medicaid funds to buy private insurance for most of the newly-
eligible adults as well as a new state-managed care program for other adults.   
New Mexico: New Mexico has approved 2,507 applications for expanded Medicaid through the 
federally operated exchange and its existing Medicaid website. In addition, 100,000 enrollees in two 
limited-benefit state health care programs will be rolled into the expanded Medicaid. New Mexico 
expects 130,000 people will be in the expanded program by 2015. 
New York: No enrollment numbers are available yet. New York already covers parents with incomes 
up to 150% of the federal poverty line ($17,235) and childless adults with incomes up to the federal 
poverty level ($11,490). 
North Dakota: The Medicaid agency has received 147 applications for expanded Medicaid. In 
December, the state plans to send letters to 36,000 households that receive food stamps or home 
heating assistance, inviting eligible adults to sign up for expanded Medicaid. Total enrollment in 
expanded Medicaid is expected to reach 32,000. 
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Ohio: The most recent state to expand Medicaid, Ohio expects to sign up 275,000 newly eligible 
Medicaid enrollees. Republican Governor John Kasich sidestepped the state legislature and won 
approval for expansion on October 21, 2013, from an executive branch Controlling Board. The state 
has not yet begun enrollment. The Medicaid agency says it will announce soon when enrollment will 
begin. 
Oregon: Oregon has approved 70,000 applications for expanded Medicaid. Its state-run website had 
some initial technical difficulties, but new applications were filed over the phone, in person, and 
through the mail. The vast majority of enrollments came from a mailing in late September that went 
to 260,000 residents who either receive food stamps or have children enrolled in Medicaid. The 
state expects roughly 223,000 adults to be enrolled in its expanded Medicaid program by 2015. 
Pennsylvania:  As of the writing of this document, Pennsylvania’s plan had not formally been 
crafted. Pennsylvania is planning to submit an 1115 waiver and model its reforms after the Arkansas 
plan by; increasing access to private market coverage through the Healthy Pennsylvania Private 
Coverage Options for Pennsylvanians 21 years of age or older but under 65 years of age with 
incomes up to 138% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL), realigning the existing Medicaid benefit plan 
designs to provide health coverage based on health care needs, and promoting healthy behaviors 
and improved health outcomes through a cost sharing design and work search activities.  
Rhode Island: Rhode Island has approved 3,213 new applications for its expanded Medicaid 
program. Another 835 are in progress. Projected enrollment is 23,428. 
Vermont: About 1,000 individuals have signed up for Medicaid on Vermont's exchange or by 
submitting paper applications. In addition, 30,000 adults enrolled in two state-run low-income 
health plans will be rolled into the expanded Medicaid program. By 2015, Vermont expects 
enrollment to reach 160,000. 
Washington: Through its state-run exchange and Medicaid sites, Washington has signed up 26,336 
people. Another 30,000 people enrolled in a low-income health program will be automatically 
enrolled in expanded Medicaid, bringing the total to 56,336. The state expects 270,000 people to 
qualify by the end of 2014. 
West Virginia: West Virginia has pre-qualified 52,056 residents for its expanded Medicaid program. 
Projected new enrollment is 63,000. 
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Section IV: MaineCare Overview 
Demographic Impact 
Demographic changes are important factors not only for determining enrollment in Medicaid 
programs but also for estimating the impact on specific programs within Medicaid. This is especially 
true for the demographic factors of age distribution and poverty.  
Muskie School Population Projections62 
In the case of Maine, it has the third most aged populations in 
the country, and as of 2012, one fifth, or 17%, of Maine’s 
population was age sixty five and older.63  The Muskie School of 
Public Service of the University of Southern Maine projects that 
persons age 65 and older will grow by an estimated 46.5%, faster 
than any other segment of the population, and it would 
constitute most of the state’s population growth over the next 
ten years.64 Figure 12 shows how the Maine population by age 
                                                     
62  J. Fralich, et. al., “Older Adults and Adults with Disabilities: Population and Service Use Trends in Maine,” Chartbook, 2012 Edition, 
Figure 1–2, p. 2. 2012, accessed at:  http://muskie.usm.maine.edu/DA/Adults-Disabilities-Maine-Service-Use-Trends-chartbook-
2012.pdf 
63  Ibid, pp. 1 and 4. 
64  Idem. Note that the Chartbook reported nearly 99% of the state’s population growth would be in the age category of 65 and 
older. Although this calculation is correct when age brackets are aggregated in this manner, it may be misleading by giving the 
false impression that no category below 65 is projected to have growth when in fact four of those six age categories are projected 
to have significant growth. The calculation works that way because the age categories of 15-24 and 45-54 are projected to have 
 Figure 12: Projected Changes in Maine's Age Profile from 2012 to 2022 
In the case of Maine, it has 
the third most aged 
population in the country, and 
as of 2012, one fifth, or 17%, 
of Maine’s population was 
age sixty five and older. 
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category will change through 2022.65 The demographic distribution of age is an important 
determinant on Medicaid expenditures whereas older individuals tend to have more chronic 
illnesses and require more services.   
In regard to poverty, Maine recently has had significant growth. According to data from the Small 
Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) of the U.S. Census Bureau, there were 186,484 persons 
living in poverty, and 51,386 of them were children.  
Although Maine’s overall population growth has been somewhat slow, growing only 4.2% between 
the last two decennial censuses for an average annual rate of 0.41%, its poverty level has been 
increasing dramatically. Children had a poverty rate of 12.9% in 2000 but a poverty rate of 19.8% in 
2012. Today one in five children in Maine lives in poverty. The poverty rates are also worsening for 
the adult population.  
The growth in poverty cannot be fully explained by the last 
economic recession. In order to reduce the skewing of data due 
to the impact of economic recessions, two dates were chosen 
at similar points along the business cycle: 2000 and 2007. These 
dates are immediately before the peaks of the business cycles. 
The SAIPE data for 2000 was collected prior to the 2001 
recession that began month after the peak of March 2001, and 
the SAIPE data for 2007 preceded the recession that began the 
month after the peak of November 2007.66 However, over that time span, SAIPE data shows the 
adult population in poverty grew 3.57% annually compared to 0.06% for those adults not in poverty. 
For children in poverty, the annual growth rate was 2.37% compared to negative value of –0.94% 
for those children not in poverty. These trends have serious implications for Maine’s welfare 
programs and significantly impact the outcome of scenarios generated by the financial model 
discussed in Section V of this report.  
The growth in poverty is more than simply a fiscal concern. There are no shortages of studies that 
link poverty to increases in poor health. Studies indicate that poverty levels directly correlate with 
low birth weights, which can result in increased infant mortality rates as well as developmental 
issues in children. A study completed by Dr. Barbara Starfield provided evidence that poverty levels 
have long-term effects. The study noted that when “one birth is of low birth weight and the mother 
is poor, the likelihood of the next infant being of low birth weight exceeds 40%.”67 The American 
                                                     
negative growth, which negates the growth in the remaining four categories under age 65. Perhaps a better way to represent the 
growth would be to exclude the two age categories with negative growth, giving the result of approximately 70% of the growth 
attributed to age category of 65 and older. 
65  Ibid, p. 2. 
66  Dates used for the start of recessions are calculated by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
67  Barbara Starfield, M.D. M.P.H., “Effects of Poverty on Health Status,” Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, 2012, 
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Physiological Association found that children living in poverty are at greater risk of behavioral and 
emotional problems and developing other mental health issues, such as anxiety, depression, and 
attention deficit/hyperactivity disorders.68 This study clearly supports why the costs of mental 
health and neurological disorders are increasing. These two areas of service are MaineCare’s top 
two categories of spending. Information obtained from MDHHS reveal that Mental Health services 
is the top clinical condition for 95% of MaineCare members and second only to Neurological 
Disorders.69   
Poverty may also be linked to the overall feeling of well-being. The Centers of Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), USDHHS, captures data and reports on health-related quality of life. The CDC has 
made correlations between well-being, i.e., how healthy a person feels, relative to medical costs. 
They reported that on average in 2009 Mainers felt unhealthy, either physically or mentally, about 
six days a month. The CDC also found that younger adults, aged 18-24, suffered the most mental 
health distress and older adults suffered the most poor physical health and activity limitation. This 
number increased as the income and education levels of adults dropped.  The map in Figure 13 
shows mean unhealthy days for the United States in 2009.  These numbers are higher in 2010.70 
                                                     
accessed at:  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/issues/142739/a. 
68  Based on information accessed through the American Psychological Association website on the Effects of Poverty, Hunger, and 
Homelessness on Children and Youth. See http://www.apa.org/pi/families/poverty.aspx.  
69  Idem. 
70  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Health-Related Quality of Life (HRQOL).  “Figure 2: Mean number of reported 
Figure 13: State by State Mean Unhealthy Days in Last 30 Days 
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MaineCare Budgetary Overview 
According to data provided by MDHHS, MaineCare spending in total funds, including federal funds, 
for both services and administrative costs was $2.7 billion in SFY 2012-13, accounting for a total of 
79% of the total MDHHS agency budget. (See Figure 14.) 
For the General Fund only, MaineCare was $788 million or 73% of the department’s General Fund 
budget. (See Figure 15.) 
                                                     
physically unhealthy days in the past 30 days by state,” accessed at: http://www.cdc.gov/hrqol/data/maps/figure2-
meanphysicallyunhealthy.htm. 
Figure 15: MaineCare as Percent of Funding Source 
Figure 14: Maine DHHS Budget—General Fund Only 
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In addition to receiving funding from the General Fund and the federal government, MaineCare also 
receives revenue in excess of $250 million from the other special revenue sources, which includes 
the following: 
 The Medical Care Services Tax Account  
 The Medical Care Hospital Tax Account 
 The Nursing Facilities Tax Account 
 The Fund for a Healthy Maine 
MaineCare Services continue to comprise significant proportions of state revenue sources. For SFY 
2012-13, 24.2% of the General Fund was expended on MaineCare Services; 19.0% of all state funds, 
including the Highway Fund and other special revenue funds, were expended on MaineCare; 59.2% 
of all federal funds received by the state government were dedicated to MaineCare Services; and, 
32.2% of the total of all funds spent were expended on MaineCare Services. (See Figure 16.)  
In total dollars spent, MaineCare is the largest budget item. When focusing on just the General Fund, 
elementary and secondary education is the largest budget item. However, when the other special 
revenue funds are added to the General Fund, it adds another $255 million in state funds to support 
MaineCare, bringing the MaineCare state cost within ten percent of the total elementary and 
secondary education budget. When federal funds are included, MaineCare spends $1.93 for every 
dollar spent on elementary and secondary education. (See Figure 17.)  
Figure 16: Maine DHHS Budget—All Funds 
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As a percent of total budgetary funds (all state funds 
and federal funds), the two largest budgetary items 
comprise 35.7% (elementary and secondary education) 
and 24.2% (MaineCare) of the General Fund, leaving 
only 40.1% of the General Fund for all remaining 
government functions that need to be funded from the 
General Fund. (See Figure 18). When the Highway Fund and other special revenue funds are 
included, the two largest budgetary items comprise 21.0% and 19.0%, respectively, leaving only 
60.0% for all other government functions. When federal funds are added, then the two largest 
budgetary items switch places, with MaineCare accounting for 32.2% of all funding and elementary 
and secondary education accounting for 16.7%.  
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Maine’s level of Medicaid expenditures are high relative to what 
other states are spending, Maine spends more of its total budget 
on Medicaid. (See Figure 19.)71  
Over the past ten years, state 
funds supporting MaineCare 
services have grown more rapidly than growth in Federal 
expenditures supporting MaineCare. Average annual 
expenditure growth for MaineCare Services has been nearly 
triple the rest of the budget. For the General Fund, MaineCare 
Services grew over the past ten years at an average rate of 3.7%, 
compared to only 1.3% for the rest of the General Fund budget. 
(See Figure 20.)72 For all state funds, the growth rate for 
MaineCare Services was 6.0% compared to 2.2% for the rest of 
the state budget. For federal funds, it was only 2.6% growth for 
MaineCare Services, compared to 2.5% growth for the rest of 
the budget. In total, including all funds, the growth rate for MaineCare services was 3.8% compared 
to 2.2% for the rest of the budget. 
                                                     
71  National Association of State Budget Officers, “State Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal 2011–2013 State Spending,” 2013. 
Also, as already presented earlier in this report, Maine has the third highest spending on Medicaid in the nation. 
72  Idem. 
Figure 20: Ten Year Annual Budget Growth Comparisons 
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Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP)  
The FMAP rate is the mechanism used by the federal government to assist states in funding their 
Medicaid program. Section 1905(b) of the Social Security Act specifies a formula for calculating the 
federal assistance percentages. The formula takes into account the average per capita income for 
each state relative to the national average. By law, FMAP rates cannot be less than fifty percent.73 
The federal government has used enhanced federal assistance percentages or increases to a state 
base rate to assist the state in offsetting the budgetary demand for public welfare, but in recent 
history due to its own budgetary demands, the federal government has reduced and eliminated 
many enhanced match rates and lowered many states base rates.74   
For example, in Maine, FMAP rates have declined 
since 2000. A slight increase in 2010 was due to 
additional federal funding available in the fourth 
quarter and not an actual long-term increase in the 
state’s FMAP rate. Each percentage-point drop in 
the FMAP rate results in approximately $25 million 
in reduced federal participation, which must be 
made up with funds from the state’s revenue base. It is anticipated that states will again see a 
reduction in FMAP rates as fiscal problems continue to plague the federal government. This position 
is also backed with evidence that shows declining FMAP rates over past years, despite economic 
conditions. 
                                                     
73  United States Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) and United States Department of Health and Human Services 
Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentages or Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures FMAP, Accessed at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/fmap.htm   
74  During the federal debt ceiling debate in late 2011, the Obama administration issued a plan to cut $100 billion from federal 
Medicaid spending over the next decade by changing and replacing the traditional Federal Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAP) 
(and other funding formulas) to the states that determine how many federal dollars states get for Medicaid into a "blended rate" 
that would simplify the way federal money is divvied among the states.  The blended-rate proposal would replace this mix of 
matching rates with a single (blended) matching rate for each state, which would apparently apply to all of a state’s Medicaid and 
CHIP expenditures, outside of administrative costs. This new formula would shift a greater share of Medicaid spending to the 
states. The blended rate would be set significantly below the combined effect of the various federal matching rates a state would 
otherwise receive (in essence a cut). The Obama Administration estimated that this package of changes would save $14.9 billion 
over 10 years starting in 2017. The federal government would pay a lower percentage of overall Medicaid and Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) costs than under current law, and states would bear a greater share. Although this proposal is said to 
have been “tabled” for further study, the concept caught the attention of federal deficit reducers and could be “dusted off” for 
use in the near future. Certain policymakers also believe that reductions in federal matching assistance will deter expansions to 
health care access. Health Affairs: Health Policy Brief, January 12, 2012.  
Calculations done using the blended rate formula as early as a year ago, had the State of Maine losing close to $700 million dollars 
between 2014 and 2022 from projected spending under the ACA FMAP formula. Drew Gonshorowski, “Medicaid Expansion Will 
Become More Costly to States,” Heritage Issue Brief No. 3709.  August 30, 2012.   
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Figure 21 shows the trend line of FMAP, SCHIP FMAP, and ARRA FMAP.  SCHIP FMAP is the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program, and rates are set under Title XXI for certain children of 
expenditures for medical assistance described in portions of the Social Security Act. The rate is an 
enhanced rate established through a formula established in Section 2105(b) of the Social Security 
act and is calculated based upon the states base rate and a percent difference between that number 
and one hundred. However, no state may have a rate that exceeds eighty-five percent. The ARRA 
FMAP was temporary additional funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
to help states with revenue shortfalls and increased caseload due to the 2007-to-2009 recession. 
Each state qualified for the FMAP increases based upon three separate areas: a hold-harmless 
amount, a set 6.2% increase, and an increase related to unemployment.75  
Maine Private Health Insurance Premium Program (PHIP) 
States have pursued a number of strategies to leverage funding and stretch their health-care dollars 
in order to avoid cutting eligibility for families. Authorized under Section 1906 of the Social Security 
Act, Health Insurance Premium Payment (HIPP) programs subsidize enrollment in employer-
sponsored private health insurance for Medicaid-eligible individuals—and their families—who have 
access to such coverage and for whom it is cost-effective. When an adult is identified as having other 
private insurance coverage the member’s commercial insurance or employer-sponsored insurance 
(ESI) becomes primary and Medicaid fee-for-service is secondary. 
                                                     
75  See “ARRA - Medicaid FMAP Increase Provisions” available from the National Conference of State Legislatures, accessed at: 
http://www.ncsl.org/print/statefed/ARRA-MedicaidFMAPIncreaseProvisions.pdf.  
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Figure 21: The History of FMAP in Maine 
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PHIP created in 1993 is MaineCare’s Private 
Health Insurance Payment Program. 
Enrollment in PHIP is currently voluntary in 
Maine. To identify MaineCare members 
who are working that may have access to 
employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), PHIP 
Benefit program administrators send 
letters to MaineCare enrollees that are 
employed for 32 hours or more per week (approximately 13,000 households) and distribute 
brochures at regional intake offices and other locations.  (See Figure 22.) However, unlike the Rhode 
Island, Iowa, and Pennsylvania programs, the Maine PHIP program has shown low enrollment and 
minimal cost-savings.  
Currently, 400 MaineCare households and 1,345 individuals representing less than one percent of 
total MaineCare working age families participate in PHIP. Rhode Island, in particular, began with low 
enrollment under a voluntary program but was able to reach more than 6% of cases when 
enrollment in HIPP was mandated.  MaineCare requires members to contact the PHIP administrator 
in order to be enrolled. Rhode Island also passed legislation to require Medicaid Providers to submit 
information on employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) as a condition for enrollment. In 
addition, all other employers were required to submit timely filings on ESI (RIGL 40-6-9.1). 
Initial Issues with Quality 
In Section II of this report, a number of quality issues with Medicaid in general were highlighted. 
The process of evaluating Maine’s performance measures is ongoing; 
however, a number of performance measures have been examined in 
several areas. Consistent with national studies, two areas that 
surfaced immediately within MaineCare were readmission rates and 
waitlists for waiver services. Both issues tend to have similar 
demographics; they both tend to be older adults with multiple chronic 
conditions whose care is uncoordinated.  
Maine readmission rates within 30 days for persons in many areas exceeded the national average. 
(See Figure 23.) Readmission is defined as a secondary admission for the same admitting diagnosis 
within a thirty day period.76 MaineCare has attempted to curb these trends through an existing 
policy. Currently MaineCare does not reimburse for readmission within 72 hours and will be 
extending this period to 14 days based on recommendations from the MaineCare Redesign Task 
Force.77 
                                                     
76  MaineCare Redesign Task Force Recommendation Report, December 2012. 
77  Idem. 
State Program Start
Percent of Families 
Enrolled in HIPP
Maine 1993 Less than 1 percent 
Rhode Island 2001 6
Iowa 1991 1.6
Pennsylvania 1994 1.9
Medicaid Health Insurance Premium Programs (HIPP)
Figure 22: Percent of Families Enrolled in HIPP 
Two areas that surfaced 
immediately for waiver 
services are: 
1. Readmission rates 
2. Waitlists  
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Maine 
Rate
U.S. 
Rate
Pregnancy, Childbirth 7.0% 3.8%
Mental Health 21.5% 11.8%
Circulatory 21.5% 10.4%
Respiratory 22.4% 11.4%
Digestive 22.6% 10.3%
Alcohol/Drug Use 21.1% 13.0%
Musculoskeletal 10.8% 8.3%
Nervous 17.1% 9.5%
Liver, Pancreas 25.5% 12.3%
Metabolic 20.2% 10.7%
Skin, Breast 17.4% 8.0%
Infections 27.4% 11.5%
Kidney 23.9% 12.4%
Injuries, Poisonings 16.8% 8.4%
Health Status 18.6% 9.9%
Female Reproductive 6.4% 6.4%
Ear, Nose, Mouth & Throat 12.6% 7.2%
Myeloproliferative Diseases 49.7% 37.4%
Blood 36.4% 14.1%
Male Reproductive 12.8% 7.2%
HIV Infections 24.4% 17.2%
Multiple Trauma 10.5% 7.9%
Eye 40.9% 6.9%
Burns 5.9% 6.1%
TOTAL 17.7% 9.4%
Hospital Readmissions within 30 days
Source: Table 16 (Maine Hospital Readmissions within 30 
days), MaineCare Redesign Task Force Recommendation 
Report , December 2012, pp. 26-27.
In addition to high readmission rates, there is the issue of the large waiting 
lists to get into specific programs within MaineCare. To be clear, these waiting 
lists are for persons who 
are already members of 
MaineCare but are 
waiting for services more 
appropriate to their 
needs. As of September 2013, MaineCare had 
waiting lists for these services of approximately 
3,100 members, according to the Office of Aging 
and Disability Services (OADS). These individuals 
are often some of the most vulnerable citizens 
and include the elderly, individuals with 
disabilities, and persons with development 
disabilities. These citizens have experienced 
wait times of over two years in some cases in 
order to be placed for services that include 
state-funded home based care, assessment, and 
homemakers services. They are generally low-
income families who have no other alternative 
for medical and behavioral-health services and 
for which resources will likely be unavailable 
when ACA expansion is adopted. Complicating 
the matter of the waitlists are the numerous 
number of programs operated in order to 
effectively provide service to Mainers. Maine 
currently has eight of these programs with 
waitlists.  
 
Figure 23: Maine Readmission Rates by Medical Area 
 
Maine currently 
has eight 
programs with 
waitlists for the 
most vulnerable 
populations. 
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Figure 2478 highlights both waiver services for individuals with intellectual disabilities, physical 
disabilities and brain injuries along with state-only home-based services, the number of persons 
awaiting services, and the average costs to operate these programs. The chart indicates total 
waitlists for all programs to be slightly more than 3,900. This number is larger than the actual waitlist 
total of 3,100 due to the allowance for enrollment in more than one program. All programs listed 
offer a range of services that include personal assistance in the home with activities for daily living 
such as bathing, dressing, meal preparation, and basic housekeeping. Additional services include 
inpatient costs at nursing facilities and other residential care services. 
                                                     
78  Mary Mahew, “The MaineCare Program Right Size, Right Service, Right Priorities,” Table comes from MDHHS presentation, Fall 
2013, slide 19. 
Figure 24: State and MaineCare Program Waitlists 
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Muskie School Estimates of Average Age of Long-Term Care Users by Setting for SFY 201079 
The number of MaineCare members using long-term care services is a significant cost factor that 
needs to be considered. The bar chart was published by the Muskie School of Public Service and 
Figure 25 depicts the average age of long-term care uses by setting for SFY 2010.  
  
                                                     
79 Muskie School Chartbook, Figure 5-1, p. 18. 
Figure 25: Age by LTC Facility Statistics 
A worsening economy, an aging workforce and population, rising costs in health care, and increases in 
poverty levels will without doubt increase the utilization of current MaineCare services. 
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Figure 26 shows the various categories qualifying for MaineCare. These categories fall into one of 
two groups: traditional Medicaid and “other.” Categories under traditional Medicaid are mostly 
groups that states are mandated to cover to qualify for FMAP funding. Categories under “other” 
Medicaid groups are optional groups resulting from choices made by the state. The table shows per 
member per month (PMPM) costs for each MaineCare category. 
Policy Changes on the Uninsured and Uncompensated Care  
Since 1998, Maine has adopted a number of policies in an attempt to reduce the number of people 
without health insurance and curb uncompensated care costs.80 In 2002, Maine applied for and 
received a Section 1115(a) demonstration waiver that allowed childless adults with income at or 
below 100% of FPL to receive a comprehensive benefit package. The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid (CMS) allowed the state to tap unused disproportionate share hospital (DSH) allotments 
to make up the federal share of its waiver. Previously, a portion of the DSH allocation had been 
                                                     
80  The American Hospital Association defines uncompensated care as follows: “Uncompensated care is an overall measure of 
hospital care provided for which no payment was received from the patient or insurer. It is the sum of a hospital's ‘bad debt’ and 
the charity care it provides. Charity care is care for which hospitals never expected to be reimbursed. A hospital incurs bad debt 
when it cannot obtain reimbursement for care provided; this happens when patients are unable to pay their bills, but do not 
apply for charity care, or are unwilling to pay their bills. Uncompensated care excludes other unfunded costs of care, such as 
underpayment from Medicaid and Medicare. Hospital Care Cost,” American Hospital Association Fact Sheet on Uncompensated 
Care, December 2010. 
Figure 26: MaineCare Enrollment—Total Members and PMPM  
 
Members PMPM Members PMPM
Traditional MaineCare
   Aged 22,932         $1,472 22,778         $1,527
   Blind or Disabled 51,806         $1,579 52,015         $1,553
   Children <100% FPL 110,732       $312 107,312       $321
   Parents <100% FPL 50,494         $392 48,848         $392
   Pregnancy 1,895            $887 1,922            $912
   State Only 1,689            $2,226 767               $1,786
  Other Traditional 10,889         $267 12,754         $254
Total Traditional MaineCare 250,438       $711 246,397       $712
Other Groups
  Childless Adult Waiver 16,086         $458 10,689         $514
  Children > 100% FPL 16,363         $214 14,178         $222
   Parents (100%-150% FPL) 22,157         $280 19,702         $271
Total Other 54,607         $312 44,569         $314
Grand Totals 305,045       $639 290,965       $651
MaineCare Enrollment and Per Member Per Month (PMPM) Costs
Category
SFY 2011-12 SFY 2012-13
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divided up among psychiatric hospitals and community hospitals, 
neither of which traditionally met their DSH limit. The DSH 
allocation, currently at $85 million (state and federal) became the 
upper limit for the program.  In the waiver proposal, the state 
estimated that 11,000 new members would enroll in the first year.  
However, by October 2003, fourteen months after implementation 
– 16,854 newly eligible childless adults had enrolled in MaineCare.  
Due to the subsequent State budget shortfalls and the risk of 
exceeding the waiver cost neutrality terms, Maine requested to amend the waiver by reducing the 
current demonstration benefit package and eliminating retroactive coverage for demonstration 
populations. These amendments were approved on September 6, 2005 shortly after enrollment was 
temporarily capped. Subsequently, enrollment caps were used to control spending and by 2013, the 
cap reduced the program’s spending to approximately $40 million in combined annual federal and 
state spending. As of September 2013, there were less than 8,500 enrolled childless adults. The 
waiver to cover these individuals expired on December 31, 2013.81  
While these policies did result in small and temporary decreases in the number of uninsured citizens, 
it proved not to be a long-term solution in reducing the number of uninsured citizens, which has 
remained fairly constant on an annual basis as a percentage of all individuals under 65 years of age, 
as can be seen in Figure 27. Over the same period of time, from SFY 1999-2000 to SFY 2012-13, the 
total MaineCare budget, including both state and federal funds, rose from $1.2 billion to almost $2.5 
billion, an increase of 109%. In terms of state funds, the increase was even greater. It grew from 
$403 million to $992 million, an increase of 146%. 
Maine’s experience in expanding eligibility for MaineCare did not result in a noticeable reduction in 
uncompensated care. Latest estimates by the Maine Hospital Association place charity care at 
approximately $200 million. Just like enrollment and the MaineCare budget, hospital charity care 
also exceeded budget targets as it grew by more than 200% from 2000 to 2013. As these numbers 
clearly indicate, despite efforts to expand health coverage in order to reduce the number of 
uninsured citizens and curb uncompensated care, both issues remain unsolved. 
                                                     
81 Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Waiver Information, accessed at http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-
Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/me/me-childless-adults-fs.pdf.  
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
12 10 12 11 10 12 12 11 11
US Census Bureau
Maine Insurance Coverage for Individuals under 65 Years Old
Percent Uninsured
Figure 27: Maine Uninsured Rates 
Even with expansions of 
public programs over the 
years, Maine’s percentage 
of uninsured residents 
under age 65 has 
remained fairly constant 
on an annual basis.  
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This lack of evidence linking Medicaid eligibility expansions with reductions in uncompensated care 
costs may be explained by the results of several studies, including one by Jonathan Gruber and 
Simon Kosali, (2007).82   
As the study found:  
“continued interest in public insurance expansions as a means of covering the 
uninsured highlights the importance of estimates of ‘crowd-out,’ or the extent to 
which such expansions reduce private insurance coverage. Our results clearly show 
that crowd-out is significant; the central tendency in our results is a crowd-out rate 
of about 60%.” 
Recent evidence from employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) in Maine would support that research. 
From 2000 to 2011, ESI coverage in Maine for the under-65 population fell from 69.6 to 61.3%.83   
  
                                                     
82  Jonathan Gruber and Simon Kosali. “Crowd-Out Ten Years Later: Have Recent Public Insurance Expansions Crowded Out Private 
Health Insurance?” National Bureau Economic Research, January 2007. The continued interest in public insurance expansions as 
a means of covering the uninsured highlights the importance of estimates of "crowd-out", or the extent to which such expansions 
reduce private insurance coverage. Ten years ago, Cutler and Gruber (1996) suggested that such crowd-out might be quite large, 
but much subsequent research has questioned this conclusion. “We revisit this issue by using improved data and incorporating 
the research approaches that have led to varying estimates. We focus in particular on the public insurance expansions of the 
1996–2002 period. Our results clearly show that crowd-out is significant; the central tendency in our results is a crowd-out rate 
of about 60%.” 
83  Elise Gould, “Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Coverage Continues to Decline in a New Decade., EPI Briefing Paper #353, 
Economic Policy Institute, December 5, 2012. 
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Section V: Results of the Financial Model 
Overview of Financial Model 
The Alexander Group developed and customized a financial model to forecast enrollment and the 
associated fiscal costs of MaineCare. Various scenarios assuming current trends were run to help 
Maine policymakers understand potential costs if Maine were to decide to expand eligibility for 
MaineCare pursuant to the ACA that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled is optional for the states. 
The first step in any financial model is to establish a baseline, without which there would be no basis 
for knowing what the additional cost of a proposal would be. The second step is to incorporate 
changes to the baseline to include a test case, i.e., a proposal being considered. The third step is to 
compare the scenarios and evaluate the differences between the test case and the baseline. 
The Baseline is a forecast of how the MaineCare will track in 
the future without expansion and assuming pending changes 
to MaineCare as approved by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) of USDHHS. Although MaineCare 
previously allowed enrollment of parents up through 138% of 
FPL, beginning on January 1, 2014, MaineCare only allows 
enrollment up to 100% of FPL. Also beginning on January 1, 
2014, the Childless Adults Waiver expired. Although this waiver 
allowed coverage for childless adults up to 100% of FPL, and as 
explained earlier in this report, enrollment in the waiver was 
capped for budgetary reasons. It is important to differentiate 
the Baseline of the financial model from any baselines 
established for purposes of Maine’s biennial budget. 
For this analysis, the test case being evaluated is that Maine would expand eligibility of MaineCare 
to allow enrollment of all individuals determined to have income equal to or less than 138% of FPL. 
This test case is called the Expansion Scenario. The financial model assumes an effective date of July 
1, 2014, for implementation of the expansion. 
The Baseline and the Expansion scenarios presented in this section are based on current-trend 
analysis that assumes the determining factors will continue their current trajectory; i.e., the values 
chosen for these factors are in the middle of a possible range of options. As with all forecasts, there 
are risks that these scenarios will not be realized and the actual path taken will vary above or below 
the forecast. These possibilities will be dealt with in Section VI on risk analysis. More technical 
information on methodology, key assumptions, and data sources are found in Appendix A.  
The Scenarios 
The Baseline assumes two 
MaineCare programs are 
discontinued: (1) parents 
101% to 138% of FPL, and (2) 
the Childless Adult Waiver. 
The Expansion Scenario 
assumes allowing everyone 
at 138% of FPL to be eligible 
for MaineCare. 
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Population 
The financial model included in its analysis all individuals 
enrolled in MaineCare, including those participating in 
the Medicaid Savings Plan.84 
The AG Financial Model utilizes standard actuarial 
analysis (See Figure 28) to predict potential growth in the 
Baseline scenarios. An important factor used in the 
analysis is the poverty rate. Because Maine has had a 
significant increase in its poverty rate, it impacts the 
forecast on the number of individuals who will become 
eligible for MaineCare.  
The graph in Figure 29 shows the estimated growth in poverty based on historical trends and 
actuarial assumptions. The actuarial assumptions used for these scenarios are middle values, that 
is, the actual growth could be somewhat higher or lower than projected. The risks of higher or lower 
growth are discussed in Section VI of this report. Importantly, the growth in poverty will impact both 
the Baseline as well as the Expansion Scenario.  
                                                     
84  Medicare buy-in groups with income between 100% of FPL and 175% of FPL who meet the criteria for participation in Drugs for 
Elderly (DEL) program and/ or Maine Rx were included in the forecast. 
Figure 28: Actuarial Projected Growth Rates 
Figure 29: Maine Actuarial Forecast of Persons in Poverty 
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Actuarial Forecast
Age Group
General 
Population 
Growth
Final Growth 
Factor When 
Adjusted for 
Poverty Growth
Under 18 -0.0131 0.0308
18-64 0.0046 0.0248
     65 and Over 0.0156 0.0361
Total 0.0024 0.0278
Annual Average Projected Growth Factors 
Based on Actuarial Analysis
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Because of the high poverty growth, the financial model predicts a significant growth in the Baseline 
scenario, which can be seen in Figure 30. Thus, even without expanding eligibility, MaineCare 
enrollment is projected to grow by an annual average of 2.7% for the Baseline. This may not seem 
to be tremendous growth, and it is not over one or two years. However, growth rates when 
sustained compound and grow exponentially. Therefore, a 2.7% annual growth rate over nine years 
is a total increase of nearly 27%, which would add 85,700 persons to the enrollment, bringing the 
SFY 2023-24 Baseline enrollment to 406,100. 
Under the Expansion Scenario, the population will grow more dramatically. The average annual 
growth becomes 5.2% over ten years, which would be a total increase of 66.7%. For enrollment 
excluding those participating in the Medicaid Savings Plan, the growth is even greater: 5.7% over 
ten years with a total increase of 74.7%. 
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Figure 30: Baseline Enrollment Forecasts  
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Enrollment under the Expansion Scenario in SFY 2023-24 would have an additional 212,100 persons 
than in SFY 2013-14, which includes the anticipated enrollment growth for the Baseline. However, 
the average annual growth rate can be misleading because there will initially be a large increase in 
SFY 2014-15.85 After SFY 2014-15, the average annual growth rate is projected to be 2.6%. (See 
Figure 31.) 
For this analysis, the following population groups were assumed to be added to MaineCare:  
 Childless adults up through 138% of FPL;  
 Parents between 101% and 138% of FPL; 
 Persons at 138% of FPL or below currently enrolled in private insurance who would 
voluntarily drop or lose their coverage; 
 Parents at 100% or below FPL currently eligible for MaineCare but who will enroll because 
of the so-called “woodwork effect”; and 
                                                     
85  It may take some time before the initial increase in enrollment will be accomplished, which may carry over into the succeeding 
fiscal year. To keep the model from becoming too complicated, it was assumed all of the initial increase would incur in the first 
year. 
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Figure 31: MaineCare Enrollment with Expansion 
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 Children at 200% of FPL or below who will enroll because of the “woodwork effect.”  
Figure 32 gives the estimated number of new 
persons from those categories who will likely 
enroll in MaineCare. The total initial enrollment 
is estimated to be 99,100 within the first 
program year, assuming full implementation.86  
The category of persons losing or voluntarily 
dropping private coverage requires some 
explanation. There are two subgroups within this 
category. First, there are individuals with non-
group coverage. The ACA has made many of 
these more affordable health care plans illegal, and many insurers have recently sent cancellation 
notices to holders of these policies. Because of federal requirements that plans must include all 
federally-defined essential health benefits and other regulations, replacement policies are 
significantly more expensive. That will likely make the costs of the new policies unaffordable for 
these individuals. If eligibility for Medicaid were expanded, a significant number of these individuals 
would qualify and likely come onto the MaineCare rolls. The second subgroup is comprised of those 
individuals with employer-provided coverage. There is evidence through scientific surveys, 
correlations from historic census data when Maine expanded MaineCare in prior years, and 
anecdotal evidence that some employers will drop coverage,87 and those employers that decide 
against dropping coverage can effectively maneuver to do the same for their low-income 
employees. Those employers with less than fifty employers are not subject to any federal penalties 
if they do not offer insurance. From a small business firm’s point of view, it makes financial sense to 
allow the government to pay for employee health coverage than for the firm to incur that cost. Some 
of these smaller employers, therefore, will likely drop coverage. For larger employers, there are 
penalties in the law if they do not provide health insurance to their employees, but it may not be 
necessary for them to drop coverage and sustain the penalties in order for them to encourage their 
low-income employees to enroll in Medicaid. These employers can simply choose plans with 
premium cost sharing at high enough levels that make it financially conducive for their low-income 
employees to enroll in Medicaid. This tactic also could be used by smaller employers as well. 
Census data provide estimates on the number of persons without health insurance who are 
currently eligible for MaineCare as well as parents, children, and childless adults with private 
insurance coverage with incomes at 138% of FPL or below. According to these data, there are 88,000 
persons in Maine who have private insurance with incomes below that threshold. Appendix A 
                                                     
86  Idem. 
87  Shubham Singhai, Jeris Stueland, and Drew Ungerman, “How US health care reform will affect employee benefits,” McKinsey 
Quarterly, June 2012, accessed at:  
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/health_systems_and_services/how_us_health_care_reform_will_affect_employee_benefits 
Figure 32: Expansion Enrollment for SFY 2014-15 
Expansion Enrollment Forecast
SFY 2014-15 
Estimate
Childless Adults up to 138% FPL 47,500
Parents between  101% -138% FPL 15,200
Persons 138% FPL and below who 
would lose private insurance
32,700
Parents 100% FPL and Below 
("woodwork")
1,600
Children ("woodwork") 2,100
 Total Forecast 99,100
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explains the methodology for estimating the percentage of those persons who would voluntarily 
drop or lose coverage and subsequently enroll in MaineCare under the Expansion Scenario. In 
addition, recent Census data in 2012 and 2011 estimate Maine has between 41,200 and 45,600 
uninsured persons under 138% of FPL. The methodology for the estimating the take-up rate is 
discussed in Appendix A. 
The last two categories of the expansion population 
in Figure 32 deserve further explanation. Experience 
has shown that whenever Medicaid enrollment is 
expanded, people who are already eligible also 
enroll. So, in addition to new categories that expand 
the enrolled population, there is also an increase in 
established programs. This phenomenon has been crudely called the “woodwork effect.” It comes 
from the expression that “they come out of the woodwork,” because Medicaid administrators had 
not counted on the increased enrollment. This phenomenon is thought possible because not 
everyone who qualifies for Medicaid signs up, for whatever reason he or she might have for not 
doing so. Some have suggested that the term “woodwork effect” has a negative connotation and 
have offered the term “welcome mat effect” as its replacement.  
Figure 33 provides an illustration comparing enrollment under the Baseline with the Expansion 
Scenario. The difference in the lines gives the growth in enrollment due to the expansion. 
 
Figure 33: MaineCare Enrollment Forecasts Comparison 
Experience has shown that whenever 
Medicaid enrollment is expanded, people 
who are already eligible also enroll.  This 
is called the “woodwork effect.” 
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Fiscal Cost 
The AG Financial Model shows that in these scenarios the total cost for the Baseline and Expansion 
Scenario will be significant. For the Baseline, total costs will increase on average of 5.5% per year, 
which increases the total cost by 70.5% over a ten-year period. Under the Baseline, the total cost 
for MaineCare increases by $1.9 billion, from $2.7 billion in SFY 2013-14 to $4.6 billion in SFY 2023-
24. For the Expansion Scenario, the total cost of MaineCare more than doubles to $5.5 billion in SFY 
2023-24, an increase of 105%. The average annual increase over those ten years is projected to be 
7.4%, although in the latter years it would fall closer to 5.7%.  
The results of these scenarios generated by the AG Financial Model estimate growth comparable to 
the national average as estimated by the USDHHS Office of the Actuary, discussed earlier in this 
report. Although Maine lacks the population growth of other states, its high poverty growth rate 
makes up for the difference. 
The federal government will be absorbing the lion’s share of the expansion cost in the early years. 
However, it would be incorrect to assume that Maine would not have any costs. Quite to the 
contrary, the costs will still be significant. The ACA provides 100% reimbursement for expenditures 
in calendar years (CY) 2014 through 2016 only for new eligibility groups. Because MaineCare has 
allowed more groups to become eligible prior to the enactment of the ACA, including parents above 
100% of FPL, Maine would clearly receive 100% reimbursement for those years for only the childless-
adult population with one possible exception. At the time that the ACA became effective, Maine 
had 10,500 childless adults enrolled in its Childless Adult Waiver program. These adults would likely 
receive an enhanced FMAP but still lower than the FMAP for the newly eligible groups. However, 
MDHHS is currently negotiating with CMS in order to receive the higher FMAP in the event the state 
decides to expand.  
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Figure 34 illustrates the difference in the total MaineCare costs between the Baseline and Expansion 
Scenario. Even for those categories that receive 100% reimbursement, the Federal commitment 
would decrease beginning in CY 2017, until it becomes 90% in CY 2020. The Expansion Scenario 
assumes the Federal government will continue to provide 90% after 2020, but this assumption is 
not assured considering the fiscal situation of the federal government.   
 
  
The expansion scenario assumes the Federal government will continue to provide 90% funding after 
2020, but this assumption is not assured considering the fiscal situation of the federal government. 
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Figure 34: MaineCare Total Cost Forecast 
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Given these assumptions, the AG Financial Model predicts state costs of $33.5 million in SFY 2014–
15, or $45.3 million if the higher FMAP is denied for the childless adult waiver population when 
compared to the Baseline. (See Figure 35.) The state costs are projected to grow to $125.0 million 
in SFY 2023–24, for a ten-year total of $807 million, or $840 million if the higher FMAP is denied.
Figure 35: Estimated State Cost of Expansion over Baseline 
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Figure 36 provides a more detailed summary of the scenario results of the AG Financial Model, which includes the Baseline, the Expansion 
Scenario, and the impact. It gives the projected populations, total costs, federal costs, and state costs. 
  
 
SFY:
2012-13
 Actual
2013-14
Estimate
2014-15 
Forecast
2015-16 
Forecast
2016-17 
Forecast
2017-18 
Forecast
2018-19 
Forecast
2019-20 
Forecast
2020-21 
Forecast
2021-22 
Forecast
2022-23 
Forecast
2023-24 
Forecast
Ten Year
 Total
Enrollees 336,000 318,100 320,400 328,800 337,600 346,600 355,800 365,300 375,100 385,200 395,500 406,100
Total Cost 2,659$  2,700$  2,794$  2,946$  3,114$  3,292$  3,481$  3,681$  3,892$  4,116$  4,353$  4,604$  36,274$  
Fed Cost 1,612$  1,622$  1,664$  1,768$  1,872$  1,978$  2,090$  2,209$  2,335$  2,468$  2,609$  2,758$  21,752$  
State Cost 1,047$  1,077$  1,130$  1,178$  1,242$  1,314$  1,391$  1,472$  1,557$  1,648$  1,744$  1,846$  14,522$  
Enrollees 419,500 430,400 441,800 453,400 465,300 477,500 490,200 503,200 516,500 530,200
Total Cost 3,369$  3,552$  3,753$  3,966$  4,191$  4,430$  4,682$  4,949$  5,231$  5,530$  43,653$  
Fed Cost 2,205$  2,343$  2,466$  2,586$  2,725$  2,866$  3,018$  3,188$  3,368$  3,559$  28,324$  
State Cost 1,164$  1,209$  1,287$  1,381$  1,466$  1,564$  1,664$  1,761$  1,863$  1,971$  15,329$  
Enrollees 99,100 101,600 104,200 106,800 109,500 112,200 115,100 118,000 121,000 124,100
Total Cost 575$      606$      639$      674$      710$      749$      790$      833$      878$      926$      7,379$     
Fed Cost 541$      575$      594$      607$      635$      657$      683$      720$      759$      801$      6,573$     
State Cost 33$        31$        45$        66$        76$        92$        107$      113$      119$      125$      807$        
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The Alexander Group Financial Model Results for Medicaid Expansion in Maine: Dollars in Millions
Figure 36: The Alexander Group Financial Model Results 
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Fiscal Impact 
Maine already has a relatively high percentage of its overall 
state population enrolled in MaineCare, which was 24.7% in SFY 
2012-13. (See Figure 37.) Based on the actuarial assumptions 
used in this financial model, 29.0% of the overall state 
population will be enrolled in Medicaid by SFY 2023-24 under 
the Baseline. Under the Expansion Scenario, however, 37.9% of 
the overall state population will be enrolled in Medicaid. Carrying the health-care needs of more 
than one third of the population will be challenging under any circumstance. Average costs to fund 
healthcare for members enrolled in MaineCare vary greatly among population groups, from as little 
as $3,848 annually in SFY 2012–13 for children under 100% of FPL to $18,641 for individuals with 
disabilities.  
With Medicaid expansion, 
37.9% of Maine’s population 
will be enrolled in Medicaid by 
SFY 2023-24. 
Figure 37: MaineCare as a Percent of State Population 
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In terms of state funds, the budget for MaineCare services has been growing faster than the rest of 
the state budget, almost three times as fast over the past ten years (6.0% average annual growth 
versus 2.2%). The AG Financial Model forecasts that the Baseline average annual growth rate will be 
5.5%. However, if Maine elects to expand the MaineCare eligibility, the forecasted growth rate 
becomes 6.2%. Figure 38 illustrates the differences in the growth rates, which are the financial 
obligations that must be paid for using state funds. The large dip in the state obligation for 
MaineCare services seen on the chart occurred because the federal government, through the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, provided states with one-time grants to help pay 
for Medicaid and balance their budgets during the last recession. Importantly, these differences in 
the growth rates raise an obvious fiscal concern: the state will continually have to generate 
additional revenue to support the program, even without the expansion. 
In terms of state funds, the budget for 
MaineCare services has been growing 
faster than the rest of the state budget, 
almost three times as fast over the past 
ten years (6.0% average annual growth 
versus 2.2%.) 
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The varying growth rates will cause MaineCare services, i.e., excluding administrative costs, to 
continually encompass a larger share of the state budget in regards to both state funds and federal 
funds. Figure39 shows the results of estimating the budget impact. Historic growth rates were used 
to estimate the size of the rest of the budget along with the results of the AG Financial Model for 
estimating the costs of MaineCare services. Examining just the General Fund, the percentage of the 
General Fund budget dedicated to MaineCare services was 20.3% in SFY 2002–03. This percentage 
grew to 24.2% in SFY 2012–13, and the AG Financial Model forecasts that it will become 36.2% in 
SFY 2023–24 under the Baseline. It might be noted that the percentage for SFY 2012-13 would be 
even higher if MaineCare were not supplemented with $255 million from other special revenue 
accounts. Under the Expansion Scenario, however, MaineCare will require 38.7% of the General 
Fund budget. For the overall budget, including federal funds, MaineCare will require 45.3% of the 
total budget under the Expansion Scenario in SFY 2023-24 as opposed to 40.2% under the Baseline. 
Although an economic impact statement is beyond the scope of this study, an observation is offered. 
First, however, a word needs to be said about a number of recent economic studies that have been 
produced predicting economic benefits for states that expand. These studies appear to use 
theoretical assumptions from the Neo-Keynesian school of economic thought. They generally use 
models that apply a multiplier to new spending to demonstrate increased economic activity. These 
models are seriously deficient, however, because they do not adequately account for all economic 
losses from the revenue side of the equation. A more viable model would also estimate the 
opportunity costs due to the increased taxation, government borrowing, and other impacts. It is the 
net of the benefits and losses that defines the economic impact.  
One quick way to evaluate the economic impact is to compare MaineCare enrollment to 
employment. This gives an indication of the burden placed on the employed who support the 
system. This is not an exact indicator by any means, but it nevertheless provides a rough indication. 
It is, after all, those who are employed who pay the bulk of taxes to support not only state 
The enrollment to employment ratio changes under expansion. In SFY 2012–13, the ratio was 1 to 
1.8, meaning that each person on MaineCare was supported by 1.8 employed persons. The forecasts 
show that that ratio will drop to 1 to 1.3 in 2020 under the expansion scenario. 
Figure 39: MaineCare Services as Percent of Maine State Budget by Fund 
General 
Fund
All State 
Funds
Federal Total
General 
Fund
All State 
Funds
Federal Total
2002-03 (Actual) 20.3% 13.9% 59.0% 29.0% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2012-13 (Actual) 24.2% 19.0% 59.2% 32.2% N/A N/A N/A N/A
2023-24 (Forecast) 36.2% 25.7% 65.8% 40.2% 38.7% 27.4% 71.4% 45.3%
Percent MaineCare Services to Total Maine State Budget by Fund
Baseline Expansion
SFY
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government but the federal government as 
well. Using data from these sources—the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Center 
for Workforce Research and Information of 
the Maine Department of Labor, and the 
Maine Department of Health and Human 
Services—and forecasts from the AG 
Financial Model, the enrollment to 
employment ratio changes under the 
Expansion Scenario. In SFY 2012–13, the 
ratio was 1 to 1.8, meaning that each 
person on MaineCare was supported by 1.8 
employed persons. The forecasts show that that ratio will drop to 1 to 1.3 in 2020 under the 
Expansion Scenario. (See Figures 40 and 41.) 
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Figure 40: MaineCare Enrollees to Employed Mainers Ratio 
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Each MaineCare enrollee was 
supported by 1.8 employed 
Mainers in SFY 2012-13.
Each MaineCare enrollee will 
likely be supported by only 
1.3 employed Mainers in 
2020.
Under MaineCare Expansion:
Figure 41: Comparing MaineCare Enrollment to Employment 
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Conclusion on Results of Financial Model 
From a financial standpoint, the results from the Baseline and 
Expansion Scenarios are troublesome. Critical factors, such as 
poverty growth, are causing MaineCare to continue to have 
high-cost growth far in excess of other budgetary growth. In 
other words, the State of Maine will be challenged to 
generate additional revenue in state funds to keep up with 
the growing demand for MaineCare under the Baseline, which 
is projected to require 36.2% of the General Fund budget in SFY 2023-24 when it now requires 24.2% 
of the General Fund budget. For the Expansion Scenario, the state of Maine would be required to 
generate an additional $807 million to $840 million in state funds over the next ten years in addition 
to what is required to support MaineCare under the Baseline. The next section examines risks to 
these forecasts. 
  
The results of the baseline and 
expansion scenarios will 
challenge Maine to generate 
additional revenue in state funds 
to keep up with the growing 
demand for MaineCare. 
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Section VI: Risk Analysis 
Overview 
The data generated by the financial model to forecast enrollment and costs for the Baseline and 
Expansion Scenario are based on a number of key assumptions on values of factors that will 
determine what trends will prevail in the future. Each value chosen was in the middle of an expected 
range of possibilities. For example, the PMPM growth factor has an expected value range of 1.9% to 
3.9%, and 2.9% was the chosen value for the forecast. There is risk, however, that the actual value 
that will be realized in the future will fall toward either end of the range as opposed to in the middle. 
Low-end values are defined as those values that would cause enrollment and costs to be lower than 
forecasted. High-end values are those values that would cause enrollment and cost to be more than 
forecasted. This section of the report provides analysis on the four most likely risk factors. 
The Risk Factors Considered 
The four risk factors chosen to be analyzed are the poverty growth rates, PMPM cost growth rates, 
individuals with private insurance losing coverage (private drop), and FMAP rate changes. (See 
Figure 42.)  
Each of the succeeding pages presents three possibilities for each risk factor:  
 “Low end” values are those values that result in the overall decrease in costs, which may 
include reductions in enrollment, relative to what is expected. 
 “High-end” values are those values that result in the overall increase in costs, which may 
include increases in enrollment, relative to what is expected. 
Risk Factor Explanation Impact
Poverty Growth Small changes in poverty growth influences welfare rolls. Impacts size of population eligible for 
MaineCare and overall state budget.
PMPM Health care costs have been increasing, and Maine's fee 
reimbursement rate relative to private insurers is one of 
the lowest in the country.
Rising costs impact total program costs 
and the state budget.
Private Drop Persons losing coverage within defined income ranges 
can become eligible for MaineCare.
Impacts size of population eligible for 
MaineCare and overall state budget.
FMAP FMAP rates determine cost sharing between the federal 
government and state governments.
Changes in FMAP rates have significant 
impact on state budgets.
Risk Factors Examined
Figure 42: Risk Factors Examined 
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 ‘Middle” values are values between the low-end and high-end and are subsequently 
considered to be more likely or “what is expected.” These middle values are also the 
assumptions that were chosen in the scenarios presented in Section V.  
The above values impact both the Baseline and Expansion Scenarios.  
The next four subsections provide analyses on the potential low-end and high-end values for the 
four risk factors listed above. The fifth and sixth subsections below provide analyses on what might 
be best-case scenarios and worst-case scenarios. The fifth subsection assumes that the three of the 
four risk factors will have values that fall on the low-end and high-end of their respective ranges. 
The three factors chosen are those factors most likely to vary from the middle. The sixth subsection 
assumes all risk factors turn out to be either favorable or unfavorable. 
At the top of each subsection below are three summary boxes as follows: 
 Summary Box 1 provides the low-end, middle, and high-end values for the risk factor being 
considered. 
 Summary Box 2 provides a summary of the impact assuming the low-end and high end 
values on four program metrics as they relate to the Baseline and Expansion Scenarios. The 
four program metrics are enrollment in SFY 2023-24, percent of the population on 
MaineCare in SF 2023-24, the ten-year total cost in millions of dollars, and the ten-year state 
cost in millions of dollars. This box shows the impact of those values on those metrics by 
showing how results vary assuming the middle value, the low-end value, and the high-end 
value. The box further shows the differences and percent changes from the middle value to 
both the low-end and high-end results. 
 Summary Box 3 shows how the results change by assuming the low-end and high-end values 
and their impact on the Expansion Scenario relative to the Baseline. For example, the result 
of a low-end value assumption for Expansion Scenario would be compared to the Baseline 
assuming the same low-end value. The four metrics considered are the additional enrollment 
for SFY 2023-24, the additional percentage of the population on MaineCare in SFY 2023-24, 
the additional ten-year total cost in millions of dollars, and the additional ten-year state cost 
in millions of dollars.  
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Poverty Growth Risk Factor 
Actuarial analysis was used to evaluate the poverty 
growth factor in Maine, which has been very high as 
explained earlier in the report. If the poverty rate 
increases more than expected, it will lead to more 
persons qualifying for MaineCare. Likewise, if it grows 
less than expected, it can reduce the number.  Figures 
43, 44, and 45 summarize potential factors and results.  
  
 
 
 
 
Middle
Result Result Difference % Result Difference %
Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 406,100 382,000 -24,100 -5.9% 431,900 25,800 6.4%
Percent of Population on 
MaineCare in SFY 2023-24
29.0% 27.3% -1.7% 30.9% 1.8%
10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 36,274     34,865     (1,409)       -3.9% 37,750     1,476        4.1%
10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 14,522     13,948     (575)          -4.0% 15,124     602            4.1%
Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 530,200 499,100 -31,100 -5.9% 563,200 33,000 6.2%
Percent of Population on 
MaineCare in SFY 2023-24
37.9% 35.7% -2.2% 40.3% 2.4%
10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 43,653     42,020     (1,633)       -3.7% 45,362     1,708        3.9%
10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 15,329     14,725     (604)          -3.9% 15,962     633            4.1%
Summary Box 2
Low End High EndScenario and Program Metric
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Poverty Growth Risk Factor Changes to Assumed Middle Values
Increase % Increase % Increase %
Additional Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 117,100 30.7% 124,100 30.6% 131,300 30.4%
Additional % of Population on MaineCare in SFY 2023-24 8.4% 8.9% 9.4%
Additional 10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 7,155     20.5% 7,379     20.3% 7,611     20.2%
Additional 10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 777         5.6% 807         5.6% 837         5.5%
Summary Box 3
Im
p
ac
t 
to
B
as
e
lin
e
Expansion Impact of Poverty Growth Risk Factors
Low End Middle High End
Scenario and Program Metric
Figure 45: Expansion Impact of Poverty Growth Risk Factors 
Figure 43: Poverty Growth Risk Factors 
Age Category Low End Middle High End
Under 18 2.31% 3.08% 3.85%
18 to 64 1.86% 2.48% 3.10%
65 and over 2.71% 3.61% 4.51%
Total 2.09% 2.78% 3.48%
Population Growth Factors
Summary Box 1
Figure 44: Poverty Growth Risk Factor Changes to Assumed Middle Values 
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Poverty Growth Risk Factor Impact on Total Poverty Chart: A change in the growth factor will 
impact the number of persons in poverty. Figure 46 summarizes the impact of the various growth 
factors. The solid line indicates Census Bureau estimates on the number of persons in poverty. The 
dotted lines are forecasts using actuarial assumptions. 
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Figure 46: Range of Actuarial Forecast of Persons in Poverty 
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Poverty Growth Risk Factor Impact on Children Chart: Figure 47 shows how the different growth 
factors would impact the forecast for children living in poverty. The solid line indicates Census 
Bureau estimates on the number of children in poverty. The dotted lines are forecasts using actuarial 
assumptions. 
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Poverty Growth Risk Factor Impact on MaineCare Enrollment: Figure 48 displays how different 
poverty growth factors would impact MaineCare enrollment. 
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Figure 48: Poverty Risk Factor Impact on MaineCare Enrollment 
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Poverty Growth Risk Factor Impact on MaineCare as a Percent of State Population: Assuming the 
low-end factors for poverty growth, it is anticipated that with expansion 35.7% of the Maine 
population would be serviced by MaineCare by SFY 2023-24. If the poverty rate grows more quickly 
than anticipated, 40.3% of the population would be serviced by MaineCare. (See Figure 49.) 
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Figure 49: Poverty Risk Factor Impact on MaineCare as Percent of State Population 
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Poverty Growth Risk Factor Impact on Total Cost of MaineCare: This chart provides a graphic 
presentation on how the total costs can vary based on the potential variability in poverty growth 
rates. (See Figure 50.) 
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Figure 50: Poverty Risk Factor Impact on Total Cost of MaineCare 
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Poverty Growth Risk Factor Impact on Total Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline: This chart 
provides a graphic presentation on how the total costs of the Expansion Scenario relative to the 
Baseline can vary based on the potential variability in poverty growth rates. (See Figure 51.) 
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Figure 51: Poverty Risk Factor Impact on Total Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline 
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Poverty Growth Risk Factor Impact on State Cost of Expansion relative to the Baseline: This chart 
provides a graphic presentation on how the state costs of the Expansion Scenario relative to the 
Baseline can vary based on the potential variability in poverty growth rates. (See Figure 52.) 
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Figure 52: Poverty Risk Factor Impact on State Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline  
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PMPM Risk Factor 
The second risk factor being considered is the PMPM growth 
factor. The middle value was based on computations by the 
USDHHS Office of the Actuary. The low-end value assumes 
that costs would grow by a full percentage point below that 
calculation. However, Maine’s fee reimbursement is one of 
the lowest in the nation compared to private reimbursement 
rates, which indicates there may be upward pressure to increase the rates. The high-end value is 
based on historic inflation for medical services in New England states, as measured by the Consumer 
Price Index. Figures 53, 54, and 55 summarize potential factors and results. 
  
 
 
 
Middle
Result Result Difference % Result Difference %
Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 406,100 406,100 0 0.0% 406,100 0 0.0%
Percent of Population on 
MaineCare in SFY 2023-24
29.0% 29.0% 0.0% 29.0% 0.0%
10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 36,274     33,997     (2,277)       -6.3% 38,714     2,440        6.7%
10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 14,522     13,594     (928)          -6.4% 15,517     995            6.8%
Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 530,200 530,200 0 0.0% 530,200 0 0.0%
Percent of Population on 
MaineCare in SFY 2023-24
37.9% 37.9% 0.0% 37.9% 0.0%
10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 43,653     40,901     (2,752)       -6.3% 46,603     2,949        6.8%
10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 15,329     14,345     (984)          -6.4% 16,384     1,055        6.9%
Summary Box 2
Low End High EndScenario and Program Metric
B
as
e
lin
e
Ex
p
an
si
o
n
PMPM Risk Factor Changes to Assumed Middle Values
Increase % Increase % Increase %
Additional Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 124,100 30.6% 124,100 30.6% 124,100 30.6%
Additional % of Population on MaineCare in SFY 2023-24 8.9% 8.9% 8.9%
Additional 10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 6,904     20.3% 7,379     20.3% 7,889     20.4%
Additional 10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 750         5.5% 807         5.6% 867         5.6%
Summary Box 3
Im
p
ac
t 
to
B
as
e
lin
e
Expansion Impact of PMPM Risk Factors
Low End Middle High End
Scenario and Program Metric
Figure 54: PMPM Risk Factor to Assumed Middle Values 
PMPM Growth Risk Factor
Low End Middle High End
1.90% 2.90% 3.90%
Summary Box 1
Figure 53: PMPM Growth Risk Factor 
Figure 55: Expansion Impact of PMPM Risk Factors 
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PMPM Risk Factor Impact on Total Cost of MaineCare: This chart provides a graphic presentation 
on how the total costs can vary based on the potential variability in PMPM growth rates. (See Figure 
56.) 
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Figure 56: PMPM Risk Factor Impact on Total Cost of MaineCare 
 Section VI: Risk Analysis 
 Page: 77 
 
PMPM Risk Factor Impact on Total Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline: This chart provides 
a graphic presentation on how the total costs of the Expansion Scenario relative the Baseline can 
vary based on the potential variability in PMPM growth rates. (See Figure 57.) 
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Figure 57: PMPM Risk Factor Impact on Total Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline 
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PMPM Risk Factor Impact on State Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline: This chart provides 
a graphic presentation on how the state costs of the Expansion Scenario relative to the Baseline can 
vary based on the potential variability in PMPM growth rates. (See Figure 58). 
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Figure 58:  PMPM Risk Factor Impact on State Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline 
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Private Drop Risk Factor 
The third risk factor considered is the 
number of persons with incomes below the 
ACA thresholds currently covered by health 
insurance who would become eligible for 
MaineCare if they would lose or voluntarily 
drop their private healthcare coverage. The 
percentages in Figure 59 are the factors used 
to determine the number of those persons who would ultimately sign up for MaineCare. The 
methodology for how these factors were chosen is discussed in more detail in Appendix A.  Figures 
60, and 61 summarize potential factors and results. 
 
 
 
Middle
Result Result Difference % Result Difference %
Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 406,100 406,100 0 0.0% 406,100 0 0.0%
Percent of Population on 
MaineCare in SFY 2023-24
29.0% 29.0% 0.0% 29.0% 0.0%
10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 36,274     36,274     -             0.0% 36,274     -             0.0%
10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 14,522     14,522     -             0.0% 14,522     -             0.0%
Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 530,200 522,100 -8,100 -1.5% 550,300 20,100 3.8%
Percent of Population on 
MaineCare in SFY 2023-24
37.9% 37.3% -0.6% 39.4% 1.4%
10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 43,653     43,172     (481)          -1.1% 44,797     1,144        2.6%
10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 15,329     15,286     (43)             -0.3% 15,442     113            0.7%
Summary Box 2
Low End High EndScenario and Program Metric
B
as
e
lin
e
Ex
p
an
si
o
n
Private Drop Risk Factor Changes to Assumed Middle Values
Increase % Increase % Increase %
Additional Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 116,000 28.6% 124,100 30.6% 144,200 35.5%
Additional % of Population on MaineCare in SFY 2023-24 8.3% 8.9% 10.3%
Additional 10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 6,898     19.0% 7,379     20.3% 8,523     23.5%
Additional 10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 764         5.3% 807         5.6% 920         6.3%
Summary Box 3
Im
p
ac
t 
to
B
as
e
lin
e
Expansion Impact of Private Drop Risk Factors
Low End Middle High End
Scenario and Program Metric
Figure 61: Expansion Impact of Private Drop Risk Factors 
Figure 59: Dropped Private Insurance Risk Factor 
Coverage Type Low End Middle High End
Non-group 24.0% 30.8% 54.0%
Employer-based 80.2% 95.0% 98.0%
Dropped Private Insurance Risk Factor
Summary Box 1
Figure 60: Private Drop Risk Factor Changes to Assumed Middle Values 
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Private Drop Risk Factor Impact on Enrollment: Figure 62 shows the impact on enrollment based 
on factors estimating the number of persons under 138% of FPL who would lose or voluntarily drop 
private insurance and consequently enroll in MaineCare. 
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Figure 62: Private Drop Risk Factor Impact on Enrollment  
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Private Drop Risk Factor Impact on MaineCare as a Percent of State Population: Figure 63 shows 
the impact on the percent of persons enrolled in MaineCare as a percentage of the overall 
population based on factors estimating the number of persons under 138% of FPL who would lose 
or voluntarily drop private insurance and consequently enroll in MaineCare. 
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Figure 63: Private Drop Risk Factor Impact on MaineCare as a Percent of State Population 
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Private Drop Risk Factor Impact on Total Cost of MaineCare Relative to the Baseline: This chart 
shows how total costs of the Expansion Scenario relative to the Baseline can vary based on the 
potential variability in the private drop rates. (See Figure 64.) 
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Figure 64: Private Drop Risk Factor Impact on Total Cost of MaineCare Relative to the Baseline 
 Section VI: Risk Analysis 
 Page: 83 
 
Private Drop Risk Factor Impact on State Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline: Figure 65 
shows the impact on the state cost of the Expansion Scenario relative to the Baseline based on the 
number of persons under 138% of FPL who would lose or voluntarily drop private insurance and 
subsequently enroll in MaineCare. 
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Figure 65: Private Drop Risk Factor Impact on State Cost of Expansion Relative to Baseline 
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FMAP Risk Factor 
FMAP continues to be a risk factor. The low-end 
values assume that beginning in SFY 2016-17 
Maine would receive the highest regular FMAP 
rate Maine had received in the past twenty years 
plus the enhanced FMAP rates per the ACA. The 
high-end value assumes that the fiscal crisis of 
the federal government causes Congress to cap 
FMAP rates beginning in SFY 2016-17 to be 
equivalent to Maine’s current regular FMAP across all groups, thus negating any enhanced rates.  
Figures 66, 67, and 68 summarize potential factors and results. 
 
 
Increase % Increase % Increase %
Additional Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 124,100 30.6% 124,100 30.6% 124,100 30.6%
Additional % of Population on MaineCare in SFY 2023-24 8.9% 8.9% 8.9%
Additional 10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 7,379     20.4% 7,379     20.3% 7,379     20.3%
Additional 10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 766         5.9% 807         5.6% 2,448     16.6%
Summary Box 3
Im
p
ac
t 
to
B
as
e
lin
e
Expansion Impact of FMAP Risk Factors
Low End Middle High End
Scenario and Program Metric
Figure 68: Expansion Impact of FMAP Risk Factors 
Figure 67: FMAP Risk Factors 
FMAP Category Low End Middle High End
Regular 66.58% 61.55% 61.55%
CHIP 96.09% 96.09% 61.55%
Enhanced 90.00% 90.00% 61.55%
FMAP Risk Factor
Rates in the Out Years
Summary Box 1
Figure 66: FMAP Risk Factor Changes to Assumed of Middle Values 
Middle
Result Result Difference % Result Difference %
Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 406,100 406,100 0 0.0% 406,100 0 0.0%
Percent of Population on 
MaineCare in SFY 2023-24
29.0% 29.0% 0.0% 29.0% 0.0%
10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 36,274     36,086     (188)          -0.5% 36,297     23              0.1%
10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 14,522     12,963     (1,559)       -10.7% 14,760     237            1.6%
Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 530,200 530,200 0 0.0% 530,200 0 0.0%
Percent of Population on 
MaineCare in SFY 2023-24
37.9% 37.9% 0.0% 37.9% 0.0%
10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 43,653     43,465     (188)          -0.4% 43,676     23              0.1%
10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 15,329     13,729     (1,600)       -10.4% 17,208     1,879        12.3%
Summary Box 2
Low End High EndScenario and Program Metric
B
as
e
lin
e
Ex
p
an
si
o
n
FMAP Risk Factor Changes to Assumed Middle Values
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FMAP Risk Factor Impact on State Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline: Figure 69 summarizes 
the state cost based on the FMAP risks. 
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Figure 69: FMAP Risk Factor Impact on State Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline 
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3 out of 4 Best Case / 3 out of 4 Worst Case Scenarios 
The 3 out of 4 best case scenario and 3 out of 4 worst 
case scenario assume that three of the four risk 
factors occur for each the low-end and high-end 
scenarios. Figure 70 summarizes the risk factors 
assumed by these scenarios. Figures 71 and 72 
summarize potential factors and results. 
The best case scenario assumes the following three 
risk factors: the poverty rate does not grow as rapidly as expected, the PMPM cost rises more slowly, 
and a smaller number of persons currently covered by private health insurance with incomes at or 
below 138% of FPL will lose their health coverage. The worst case scenario assumes the following 
three risk factors: PMPM costs rise more sharply, FMAP rates are reduced more drastically than 
anticipated, and a smaller number of persons currently covered by private health insurance with 
incomes at or below 138% of FPL will lose their health coverage.  
Figure 70: 3-4 Best and 3-4 Worst Case Scenarios 
Risk Factor Best Case Worst Case
Poverty Growth Considered Least Likely
PMPM Considered Considered
Private Drop Considered Considered
FMAP Least Likely Considered
Best Case/Worst Case Scenarios
Three out of Four Come True
Summary Box 1
Figure 72: Expansion Impact of 3-4 Best Case and 3-4 Worst Case Risk Factors 
Figure 71: 3-4 Best and 3-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Changes to Assumed Middle Values 
Middle
Result Result Difference % Result Difference %
Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 406,100 382,000 -24,100 -5.9% 406,100 0 0.0%
Percent of Population on 
MaineCare in SFY 2023-24
29.0% 27.3% -1.7% 29.0% 0.0%
10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 36,274     32,698     (3,576)       -9.9% 38,739     2,465        6.8%
10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 14,522     13,064     (1,458)       -10.0% 15,773     1,251        8.6%
Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 530,200 491,500 -38,700 -7.3% 550,300 20,100 3.8%
Percent of Population on 
MaineCare in SFY 2023-24
37.9% 35.2% -2.8% 39.4% 1.4%
10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 43,653     38,959     (4,694)       -10.8% 47,851     4,198        9.6%
10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 15,329     13,749     (1,580)       -10.3% 18,818     3,489        22.8%
Summary Box 2
Low End High EndScenario and Program Metric
B
as
e
lin
e
Ex
p
an
si
o
n
 3-4 Best Case / 3-4 Worst Case Scenarios Risk Factor Changes to Assumed Middle Values
Increase % Increase % Increase %
Additional Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 109,500 28.7% 124,100 30.6% 144,200 35.5%
Additional % of Population on MaineCare in SFY 2023-24 7.8% 8.9% 10.3%
Additional 10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 6,261     19.1% 7,379     20.3% 9,113     23.5%
Additional 10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 685         5.2% 807         5.6% 3,045     19.3%
Summary Box 3
Im
p
ac
t 
to
B
as
e
lin
e
Expansion Impact of  3-4 Best Case / 3-4 Worst Case Scenarios Risk Factors
Low End Middle High End
Scenario and Program Metric
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3-out-of-4 Best Case / 3-out-of-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on Enrollment: Figure 73 shows 
how MaineCare enrollment would change under the best case and worst case scenarios. 
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Figure 73: 3-4 Best Case / 3-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on Enrollment  
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3-out-of-4 Best Case / 3-out-of-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on MaineCare as a Percent of 
State Population: Figure 74 shows how MaineCare enrollment as a percent of the overall population 
would change under the best case and worst case scenarios. In the best case scenario, 35.2% of the 
population would be on MaineCare by SFY 2023-24. In the worst case scenario, it would be 39.4% 
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Figure 74: 3-4 Best Case / 3-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on MaineCare as a Percent of State Population 
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3-out-of-4 Best Case / 3-out-of-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on Total Costs of MaineCare: This 
chart provides a graphic presentation on how the total cost can vary under the best case and worst 
case scenarios. (See Figure 75.) 
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Figure 75: 3-4 Best Case / 3-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on Total Costs of MaineCare 
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3-out-of-4 Best Case / 3-out-of-4 Worst Case Factor Impact on Total Cost of Expansion Relative to 
the Baseline: Figure 76 shows how total cost for MaineCare would change due to the Expansion 
Scenario relative to the Baseline under the best case and worst case scenarios. 
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Figure 76: 3-4 Best Case / 3-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on Total Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline 
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3-out-of-4 Best Case / 3-out-of-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on State Cost of Expansion 
Relative to the Baseline: Figure 77 shows how state costs of MaineCare under the Expansion 
Scenario relative to the Baseline would change under the best case and worst case scenarios. As can 
be seen they are radically different. Under the best case scenario, Maine still has a cost of $685 
million over ten years. Under the worst case scenario, the cost would be $3.05 billion over ten years. 
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Figure 77: 3-4 Best Case / 3-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on State Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline 
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4 out of 4 Best Case / 4 out of 4 Worst Case Scenarios 
 The 4 out of 4 best case scenario and 4 out of 4 
worst case scenario assume that all four risk 
factors occur for each the low-end and high-end 
scenarios. Figure 78 summarizes the risk factors 
assumed by these scenarios. Figures 79 and 80 
summarize potential factors and results. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Middle
Result Result Difference % Result Difference %
Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 406,100 382,000 -24,100 -5.9% 431,900 25,800 6.4%
Percent of Population on 
MaineCare in SFY 2023-24
29.0% 27.3% -1.7% 30.9% 1.8%
10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 36,274     32,531     (3,743)       -10.3% 40,341     4,067        11.2%
10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 14,522     11,685     (2,837)       -19.5% 16,438     1,916        13.2%
Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 530,200 491,500 -38,700 -7.3% 584,600 54,400 10.3%
Percent of Population on 
MaineCare in SFY 2023-24
37.9% 35.2% -2.8% 41.8% 3.9%
10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 43,653     38,793     (4,861)       -11.1% 49,745     6,092        14.0%
10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 15,329     12,335     (2,995)       -19.5% 19,594     4,265        27.8%
Summary Box 2
Low End High EndScenario and Program Metric
B
as
e
lin
e
Ex
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n
 4-4 Best Case / 4-4 Worst Case Scenarios Risk Factor Changes to Assumed Middle Values
Increase % Increase % Increase %
Additional Enrollment in SFY 2023-24 109,500 28.7% 124,100 30.6% 152,700 35.4%
Additional % of Population on MaineCare in SFY 2023-24 7.8% 8.9% 10.9%
Additional 10 Year Total Cost (Millions $) 6,261     19.2% 7,379     20.3% 9,404     23.3%
Additional 10 Year State  Cost (Millions $) 649         5.6% 807         5.6% 3,156     19.2%
Summary Box 3
Im
p
ac
t 
to
B
as
e
lin
e
Expansion Impact of  4-4 Best Case / 4-4 Worst Case Scenarios Risk Factors
Low End Middle High End
Scenario and Program Metric
Figure 80: Expansion Impact of 4-4 Best Case and 4-4 Worst Case Risk Factors 
Figure 79: 4-4 Best and 4-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Changes to Assumed Middle Values 
Risk Factor Best Case Worst Case
Poverty Growth Considered Considered
PMPM Considered Considered
Private Drop Considered Considered
FMAP Considered Considered
Summary Box 1
Best Case/Worst Case Scenarios
Four out of Four Come True
Figure 78: 4-4 Best and 4-4 Worst Case Scenarios 
 Section VI: Risk Analysis 
 Page: 93 
 
4-out-of-4 Best Case / 4-out-of-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on Enrollment: Figure 81 shows 
how MaineCare enrollment would change under the best case and worst case scenarios. 
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Figure 81: 4-4 Best Case / 4-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on Enrollment  
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4-out-of-4 Best Case / 4-out-of-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on MaineCare as a Percent of 
State Population: Figure 82 shows how MaineCare enrollment as a percent of the overall population 
would change under the best case and worst case scenarios. In the best case scenario, 35.2% of the 
population would be on MaineCare by SFY 2023-24. In the worst case scenario, it would be 41.8% 
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Figure 82: 4-4 Best Case / 4-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on MaineCare as a Percent of State Population 
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4-out-of-4 Best Case / 4-out-of-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on Total Costs of MaineCare: This 
chart provides a graphic presentation on how the total cost can vary under the best case and worst 
case scenarios. (See Figure 83.) 
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Figure 83: 4-4 Best Case / 4-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on Total Costs of MaineCare 
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4-out-of-4 Best Case / 4-out-of-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on Total Cost of Expansion 
Relative to the Baseline: Figure 84 shows how total cost for MaineCare would change due to the 
Expansion Scenario relative to the Baseline under the best case and worst case scenarios. 
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Figure 84: 4-4 Best Case / 4-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on Total Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline 
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4-out-of-4 Best Case / 4-out-of-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on State Cost of Expansion 
Relative to the Baseline: Figure 85 shows how state costs of MaineCare under the Expansion 
Scenario relative to the Baseline would change under the best case and worst case scenarios. As can 
be seen they are radically different. Under the best case scenario, Maine still has a cost of $649 
million over ten years. Under the worst case scenario, the cost would be $3.16 billion over ten years. 
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Figure 85: 4-4 Best Case / 4-4 Worst Case Risk Factor Impact on State Cost of Expansion Relative to the Baseline 
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Section VII: Conclusion and Next Steps 
As this report reveals, expanding the Medicaid program in Maine involves fiscal, operational, and 
qualitative issues. The AG Financial Model demonstrates that it will be challenging for Maine to 
afford MaineCare in the future even without expansion. Given current trends, MaineCare will 
comprise larger shares of Maine’s General Fund budgets, which will grow from 24.2% of the General 
Fund budget to 36.2% in ten years. The state’s poverty growth rate is one causal factor driving the 
difference between the state cost for MaineCare and the rest-of-the-state budget. Expanding 
eligibility will only exacerbate the trend, whereby MaineCare will comprise 38.7% of the General 
Fund budget in ten years.  
In addition, the risk analysis in Section VI shows that in the best-case scenario, i.e., if three out of 
four determining factors turn out to be more favorable than predicted, expansion of Medicaid 
eligibility would still cost Maine in state funds at least $685 million over the next ten years on top of 
the cost of the Baseline. In total funds (all state and federal funds), the best-case scenario for 
expansion would have a ten-year cost of $6.3 billion, and 35.2% of the state population would be 
enrolled in MaineCare. However, the worst-case scenario, i.e., if three out of four determining 
factors turn out to be less favorable than predicted,  would cost the state $3.05 billion over the next 
ten years on top of the cost of the Baseline. In total funds, the worst-case scenario for expansion 
would have a ten-year cost of $9.1 billion, and 39.4% of the state population would be enrolled in 
MaineCare. If four out of four factors turn out to be favorable, the ten-year state costs would be 
$649 million, the ten-year total costs would be $6.3 billion, and 25.2% of the state population would 
be enrolled in MaineCare. If four out of four factors turn out to be less favorable, the ten-year state 
costs would be $3.16 billion, the ten-year total costs would be $9.4 billion, and 41.8% of the state 
population would be enrolled in MaineCare. 
The qualitative issues are no less challenging. Consistent with national Medicaid trends, 
performance measures indicate that the quality of care provided by MaineCare does not match 
what is available elsewhere, including commercially available insurance. Expanding MaineCare does 
not address any of these quality-of-care issues; moreover, expansion may leave those losing 
commercial coverage with no other choice but to enroll in MaineCare. Expansion will also divert 
resources from addressing serious program-integrity issues to protect the program against waste, 
abuse, and fraud. Finally,  expansion will allow those less vulnerable to access comprehensive care 
while doing nothing to alleviate MaineCare's current challenge to eradicate the waiting lists for the 
intellectually disabled and elderly populations. 
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The more pressing needs are restructuring and streamlining to make MaineCare more efficient and 
to deliver better quality outcomes. As in most states, over time, the system has been so expanded 
and changed in a piecemeal manner that it has become uncoordinated, difficult for many to 
navigate, lacking in key program-integrity safeguards, and exhibiting cost factors that exceed the 
growth of the rest of the General Fund budget. Expanding MaineCare at the current time will likely 
divert resources away from reform efforts necessary to address these pressing issues and to 
improve the program. 
Health-care access and improved health outcomes remain a necessity. Expansion of Medicaid at the 
present time however, may not be the best policy choice to attain those goals. Other viable 
alternatives may allow Maine to improve access and quality while prioritizing needs and saving tax 
dollars. Consequently, Maine needs a state-based solution with flexibility from the federal 
government that focuses on access, transparency, quality, personal responsibility, and efficiency. 
That kind of alternative would likely offer executive and legislative policymakers greater budgetary 
certainty and allow them to focus on other fiscal and policy priorities. 
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Appendix A: Methodology, Assumptions, Data, and Other Technical 
Information 
Overview 
The financial model used for this study was specifically developed and customized by The Alexander 
Group for the State of Maine. Because each state is different, it is necessary to tailor a model to the 
specific demographics of a state as well as the unique characteristics of its Medicaid program. No 
two states are alike, and more generic models miss these nuances that produce less specific results.  
There are numerous assumptions and data sources that were utilized in generating the Baseline and 
Expansion scenarios. This appendix summarizes the more important ones. 
Population Groups 
The following populations groups were identified for use in the model:  
Group A 
 Traditional MaineCare Major categories: 
o Aged 
o Blind/Disabled 
o Children with incomes up to 100% of FPL 
o Parents with incomes up to 100% of FPL 
o Pregnancy 
o State only 
o Other 
 Children on CHIP with incomes 101% to 138% of FPL 
 Children on CHIP with incomes 139% to 200% of FPL 
 Parents with incomes between 101% and 138% of FPL 
 Childless adults covered under the childless adult waiver 
 Foster children between the ages of 19 and 25 
 Medicaid Savings Plan participants, i.e., in Drugs for Elderly (DEL) program and/ or Maine Rx 
Group B 
 Children “woodwork effect” 
 Parents “woodwork effect” 
Group C 
 Other childless adults not covered under the waiver with incomes up to 138% of FPL 
Group D 
 Children covered by private insurance with incomes up through 200% of FPL 
 Parents covered by private insurance with incomes up through 138% of FPL 
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Group A are those categories for which MDHHS was able to produce population data from internal 
database systems.  
Group B are the woodwork-effect populations. In these cases, population estimates were created 
by multiplying 2011 Current Population Survey (CPS) data estimates issued by the U.S. Census 
Bureau on the number of children and parents currently eligible for Medicaid but not enrolled with 
take-up rates of 23.4% as published by the Kaiser Family Foundation for Health Policy Analysis.88  
Group C are adults not on the childless adult waiver and with incomes up to 138% of FPL. This 
estimate was derived by using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey for 
2012, multiplied by a take-up rate of 82% pursuant to a study for the Assistant Secretary for Planning 
and Evaluation, USDHHS, by the RAND Corporation specifically on take-up rates for Medicaid 
enrollment per the ACA.89  
Group D are those persons who are currently covered by private insurance but would lose their 
coverage due to the anticipated effect of employers dropping coverage, employers taking other 
action encouraging low-wage employees to sign up for Medicaid as opposed to employer-provided 
insurance, insurers cancelling policies due to requirements of the ACA, or other voluntary actions 
by the policyholders. Estimates of children, childless adults, and parents at incomes below 138% of 
FPL, in addition to children from 139% to 200% of FPL, were derived from CPS data, which were 
further broken down into subcategories of those with employer health insurance coverage and non-
group coverage. The two different take-up rates applied were 95% for those with non-group 
coverage and 30.8% for those with employer-based coverage. The assumption of 95% comes from 
the USDHHS Office of the Actuary.90 The ACA was designed in a manner to increase insurance costs 
for this segment of the population, which has the effect of making many of these policies illegal, 
causing them to be withdrawn by insurers. It is likely that most of the childless adults in this category 
would have their policies withdrawn and the replacement options made available to them will be 
significantly more expensive. With the expansion of Medicaid, it would become the logical choice to 
choose free coverage over non-group policies that will likely be out of their price range. Because 
take-up rates never equal 100%, the model assumed the USDHHS assumption of 95% for the middle 
value. The RAND Corporation computation of 82% was used for the low-end risk analysis. 98% was 
used the high-end risk analysis. The assumption of 30.8% comes from a published survey of 
                                                     
88  John Holahan, Matthew Buettgens, Caitlin Carroll, and Stan Dorn, The Urban Institute, “The Cost and Coverage Implications of 
the ACA Medicaid Expansion: National and State-by-State Analysis,” Sponsored and published by the Kaiser Commission on 
Medicaid and the Uninsured, November 2012  
89  Ben Sommers, Rick Kronick, Kenneth Finegold, Rosa Po, Karyn Schwartz, and Sherry Glied, “Understanding Participation Rates in 
Medicaid: Implications for the Affordable Care Act,” ASPE Issue Brief, March 2012. Accessed at: 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2012/MedicaidTakeup/ib.shtml. 
90  Idem. 
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McKinsey & Company.91 The proprietary research that surveyed 1,329 employers in February 2011 
assessed their attitudes and plans on the ACA. One of the many findings was that 24% of employers 
with a low awareness of the ACA thought they might likely drop employee health coverage, 30.8% 
of employers with medium awareness thought they likely might, and 54% of employers with a high 
level of awareness thought they might likely drop. These values are used in the risk analysis In 
Section VI of this report.  
It is important to note that employers can easily deploy tactics other than dropping health insurance 
coverage altogether to encourage their low-wage workers voluntarily drop coverage and sign up for 
Medicaid. Employers with more than fifty employees are required under the ACA to offer health 
insurance to its employees, and federal law92 requires them to have rational policies that do not 
discriminate, therefore requiring them to offer health care to all employees if they offer it to some 
employees of the same full-time or part-time status. However, by simply requiring employees to 
make contributions to the cost of the premium, it can make the employer-based health insurance 
significantly expensive to low income employees, especially when compared to Medicaid which has 
no premium cost share. 
Actuarial Growth Assumptions 
The model used standard actuarial methodologies to 
forecast population growth factors. Separate growth 
factors were generated accounting for poverty by the 
following age groups: under 18, 18-64, over 65, and an 
overall growth factor. In addition, growth factors were 
calculated for the total population. The low-end and high-
end values were calculated assuming a 25% variance. 
The results of the actuarial growth factors were compared to historic MaineCare and poverty growth 
between two similar points along the business cycle for comparability, and they were found to be 
similar. Figure 80 shows the final change in population factors used.  
PMPMs 
The PMPMs were calculated for each category, using data for SFY 2012-13, and was provided by the 
MDHHS Benefit Analytics team. Figure 81 shows the actual PMPMs per category.  
                                                     
91  McKinsey Quarterly., already cited. 
92 See “Self-Compliance Tool for Part 7 of ERISA: HIPAA and Other Health Care-Related Provisions,” U.S. Department of Labor. 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/part7-1.pdf, accessed December 19, 2013. 
Age Category Low End Middle High End
Under 18 2.31% 3.08% 3.85%
18 to 64 1.86% 2.48% 3.10%
65 and over 2.71% 3.61% 4.51%
Total 2.09% 2.78% 3.48%
Population Growth Factors
Figure 86: Population Growth Factors 
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Population groups without calculated PMPMs were matched 
with the PMPMs of the closest population group that had a 
calculated PMPM. For example, childless adults not covered by 
the waiver were assumed to have the same PMPM as those 
covered by the waiver.  
PMPM Growth Factors 
Projecting the growth rate for PMPMs is complex because so 
many factors come into play. Inflation specific to the health 
care industry influences the rise in costs. The Consumer Price 
index for medical care for the Boston-Brockton-Nashua, MA-
NH-ME-CT area, which includes Maine, was 3.9% over the last 
ten years. However, Medicaid reimbursement fees are 
negotiated between CMS and the state and have been notoriously low, thus creating the problem 
of not having enough doctors willing to serve Medicaid clients. Lack of access can in turn cause 
political pressure to increase fees, but these efforts are constrained by the reality of limited budgets. 
Consequently, Medicaid fees lag inflation. However, utilization is also a cost determinant, and some 
Medicaid patients tend to use services more frequently or in more costly settings, such as 
emergency rooms. The model assumed the 2.9% factor used by the USDHHS Office of the Actuary, 
and is similar to national historic cost. This assumption is conservative. The low-end and high-end 
risk factors assumed 1.9% and 3.9%. 
FMAP 
FMAP rates were provided by the MDHHS Benefits Analytic team. Because these are calculated 
based on a federal formula whose factors vary on an annual basis and because they can change by 
a whim of Congress, it is difficult to forecast FMAP rates. It was assumed that FMAP rates will remain 
constant. The table in Figure 82 displays the assumed rates. 
Because the FMAP rate for childless adult under 100% of FPL was unavailable at the time of writing 
this report, the two potential FMAP rates for this category are listed as “Childless Adult (<=100% of 
Figure 87: Actual PMPMs Per Category 
Figure 88: Assumed FMAP Rates 
 Category PMPM
Traditional Medicaid 712.23     
  Aged 1,526.93 
  Blind/Disabled 1,553.38 
  Children < 100%  of FPL 320.64     
  Parents < 100% of FPL 392.38     
 Pregnancy 912.29     
 State Only 1,785.96 
 Other Traditional 254.15     
CHIP 222.04     
Childless Adults (Waiver) 514.18     
Parents to 138% of FPL 271.46     
Foster Children 257.60     
2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 2023-24
Available Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast
Traditional Medicaid 61.81% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55%
CHIP 73.27% 73.09% 90.34% 96.09% 96.09% 96.09% 96.09% 96.09% 96.09% 96.09% 96.09%
Foster Children 61.81% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55%
Parents 61.81% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55% 61.55%
Childless Adult (<=100% FPL)-1 80.78% 82.70% 86.54% 88.51% 89.56% 91.90% 91.50% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Childless Adult (<=100% FPL)-2 80.78% 100.00% 100.00% 97.50% 94.50% 93.50% 91.50% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Childless Adult (101%-138%) 100.00% 100.00% 97.50% 94.50% 93.50% 91.50% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 90.00%
Administration 61.56% 61.56% 61.56% 61.56% 61.56% 61.56% 61.56% 61.56% 61.56% 61.56% 61.56%
Administration (Enhanced) 90.00% 90.00% 90.00% 61.56% 61.56% 61.56% 61.56% 61.56% 61.56% 61.56%
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FPL)-1” and “Childless Adult (<=100% of FPL)-2.” These different reimbursement rates only impacts 
state costs, not total costs. Both rates were considered in the financial model. 
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Allotments 
Maine’s disproportionate share hospital (DSH) allotments will be reduced over time using a 
methodology based on state comparisons in uninsured populations and the targeting of payments 
to hospitals with a high volume of Medicaid patients and high volume of uncompensated care costs. 
CMS has not yet released revised DSH allotments at the time of the writing of this report. Maine’s 
allotment was capped in SFY 2012-13 at $86 million, of which $50 million is used for the childless 
adult waiver and $36 million for the state psychiatric hospitals at Riverview and Dorothea Dix. DSH 
is included in the model as part of the overall budget cost to operate MaineCare, which is included 
in both the Baseline and the Expansion Scenario. Because the childless adult waiver expired, the 
assumption was to keep the value constant because no further information was available at the 
time to assume otherwise. The impact, however, would likely be minor compared to the other 
potential costs and risks identified by the model. If, for example, Maine continues to receive the $50 
million, it could choose to use it for uncompensated care, which would require a match of $31.2 
million at the current FMAP rate. In the Expansion Scenario, it could be assumed that the $50 million 
would be phased out over a number of years, resulting in a loss of $50 million in federal money but 
no state costs associated with that loss. It could be argued, therefore, that there is a potential state 
cost of $31.2 million to the state for not expanding, if the state were to receive and accept $50 
million from the federal government for DSH. However, this would be a voluntary cost and also a 
political decision, which is beyond the scope of this study. 
Administrative Costs 
The model assumes administrative costs pursuant to an analysis and estimates by MDHHS. 
Administrative costs for the Baseline used historic experience, and after adjusting for one-time 
federal funds and other one-time payments, it estimated an annual growth rate of 2.46%. For the 
Expansion Scenario, it assumed that 97 additional personnel would be required to determine 
eligibility and manage the additional workload. These costs were estimated to be $7.44 million for 
SFY 2014-15.  
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Appendix B: Key AG Team Members Who Contributed to This Report 
Gary D. Alexander, J.D. 
Mr. Alexander is the founder, president, and CEO of the Alexander Group. He is a nationally recognized 
health-care and Medicaid expert, welfare reformer, and budget specialist. For over 16 years, he has 
transformed underperforming state health and welfare agencies into accountable, value-oriented, and data 
and performance-driven systems by pioneering structural reforms and state-of-the-art technology solutions 
that have improved outcomes and quality, lowered health-care costs, reduced fraud and waste, re-
engineered employment programs, modernized access, and eliminated budget deficits. A pragmatic and 
decisive leader, Alexander has a track record not only of identifying problems but also assembling the right 
mix of talent, policy makers, and stakeholders to generate data-driven solutions with quantifiable results to 
some of the most vexing challenges facing federal, state, and local governments.  
Prior to founding the Alexander Group, Mr. Alexander served as Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett’s 
secretary of public welfare and Governor Tom Corbett’s senior health and welfare advisor from 2011 to 2013. 
In that dual role, he oversaw overall operations, management, and policy development for one of the largest 
health and welfare agencies in the nation, a department with a budget of $27.5 billion, 6 hospitals, 5 state 
intermediate facilities, 94 offices, 16,500 employees, and 2.2 million public-assistance recipients. 
Upon arrival in Pennsylvania, Mr. Alexander faced double-digit growth, an uncoordinated service structure, 
and a fragmented organization. To fix these problems, he crafted and implemented a cutting-edge plan to 
eradicate fraud and waste called the Enterprise-wide Program Integrity and Improvement Initiative. This 
program-integrity initiative has been lauded by Medicaid and welfare-reform experts and earned the 
department a national innovation award for Excellence and Best Practice from the Council of State 
Governments.   
Prior to his tenure in the Keystone State, Mr. Alexander created and implemented similar reforms as Rhode 
Island’s secretary of health and human services and human-services director from 2006 to 2011. He is the 
author and architect of the 2009 landmark Rhode Island Global Medicaid Waiver that, for the first time, 
delivered unprecedented flexibility to a state to redesign its Medicaid program. Relieving the state of 
burdensome federal mandates and requirements, this groundbreaking reform improved care quality, 
outcomes and access, lowered public costs, created more choices for recipients—including more appropriate 
care settings—and properly aligned services and benefits. The waiver’s long-term care redesign is also being 
used as a model of reform around the nation. In its first two years, the waiver not only saved approximately 
$100 million but also kept total Medicaid spending at billions of dollars below the agreed-upon spending 
limit. To this day, the waiver continues to help Rhode Island solve budget deficits and improve quality. By 
improving quality, choice and access for recipients and introducing accountability into Medicaid, Alexander’s 
initiative has been cited as a model of entitlement reform, particularly Medicaid and health care reform by 
various experts and publications, including The Wall Street Journal and the Providence Journal. 
Mr. Alexander has worked on both sides of the aisle and has a reputation for reaching consensus to solve 
complex problems. Consequently, members of congress, elected officials, and policy makers consistently 
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seek his advice on entitlement reform. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Northeastern University and 
a Juris Doctor (J.D.) from Suffolk University School of Law.   
Erik D. Randolph 
Mr. Randolph spent 28 years of his professional career in government, including 21 years with experience in 
fiscal analysis of legislation and government programs that involved determining fiscal impacts, forecasting 
costs and revenues, budgeting, and working with financial and economic models. He began his career as a 
program evaluator with the U.S. General Accounting Office, which was renamed the Government 
Accountability Office in 2004. He then worked five years for two different states in the fields of economic 
development and science and technology policy. Afterwards, he achieved the position of senior analyst for 
Chairman Dwight Evans (D) of the Committee on Appropriations, Pennsylvania House of Representatives. He 
also spent two years as a special policy and fiscal assistant advising Mr. Alexander when he served as 
Secretary of Public Welfare for Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett (R). He has taught principles of 
economics for 17 years. He has a Master of Science degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and two 
Bachelor degrees from the Pennsylvania State University. 
Murray M. Blitzer 
Mr. Blitzer possesses over 30 years of experience in public administration and finance with a specialty in 
Medicaid and human services. He was the Chief Financial Officer for the Rhode Island Department of Human 
Services, overseeing a $1.5 billion budget and over 1,000 employees. He also served in the Rhode Island 
Legislature as Deputy to the Senate Fiscal Officer. In the Senate, as an advisor to the Majority Leader, he 
implemented a budget hearing and review process that allowed the membership equal participation in 
formulating policy. Murray began his career in the Rhode Island State Budget Office where he designed and 
implemented the structure for the state’s Consensus Medical Assistance and Caseload Estimating 
Conference, applying professional forecasting tools to over $2 billion in health care and welfare spending. 
Throughout his public career Murray has successfully worked with private entities to reduce the cost of 
government and deliver services that have had a positive impact on the lives of many consumers. Murray 
holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Resource Technology and Economics from the University of Rhode 
Island.  
Jennifer M. Wier 
Ms. Wier, C.P.A., has more than 17 years of experience. She has expertise in Medicaid and is also extremely 
knowledgeable about information systems, systems modeling, and data mining.  Ms. Wier has spent the past 
five years dedicated solely to Medicaid assisting in the analysis of the program from both quantitative and 
qualitative perspectives. She has audited both financial and policy components and is well versed in federal 
regulations as they pertain to the program.  She has assisted in the drafting of legislation affecting several 
components of the Arkansas Medicaid program, including the creation of the Office of Medicaid Inspector 
General for the State of Arkansas as well as legislation affecting provider enrollment. For the past five years 
as a member of the Division of Arkansas Legislative Audit, she has been responsible for reporting on all 
Medicaid and human service programs of interest to the General Assembly and has acted as an independent 
liaison between the legislators and the program administrators. She has a Bachelor of Science in Accounting 
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from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock and is a member of the Arkansas Society of Professional 
Accountants and the Arkansas Information System Audit and Control Association. 
Kevin K. Gabriel 
Mr. Gabriel is an actuary and has 30 years of experience and has worked in the healthcare and employee 
benefits areas for over 20 years. He began his career with a national writer of group health insurance and 
later moved to a pair of major reinsurers in the Health arena. In his last position before becoming a 
consultant, Kevin ran the Accident and Health Reinsurance division for a major A-rated life insurer. Kevin’s 
worked has included the pricing of a wide range of medical products, the evaluation of managed care 
networks and managed care intervention programs, and the assessment of liabilities for insurers and 
employers. More recently, he has worked on issues related to healthcare reform and has been involved in 
the preparation of bids for demonstration projects related to new healthcare initiatives. Mr. Gabriel has a BA 
from Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut, and an MBA from the Wharton School of the 
University of Pennsylvania. In addition, he is a Fellow of the Society of Actuaries and a member of the 
American Academy of Actuaries. 
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The Alexander Group, LLC (AG) is a government and business consulting firm that delivers cutting-
edge data-driven solutions, strategic business development, and innovative health-care and 
technology platforms—to improve efficiency, effectiveness, and quality for our clients. AG possesses 
unique expertise in the government health-care marketplace, built upon two decades of not only 
operating large-scale health and human-services agencies but also pioneering reforms that saved 
states billions of dollars and improved service quality. Founded in 2013 by reformer Gary D. 
Alexander, the firm is the only group of public officials who have designed, implemented, and 
managed nationally acclaimed reforms like the Rhode Island Global Medicaid Waiver and, in 
Pennsylvania, The Enterprise-Wide Program Integrity Plan and The Health and Human Services 
County Block Grant. 
The firm’s specialties range from health care and social welfare to management consulting — 
including but not limited to health care plan design, Medicaid, Medicare, long-term care and 
accreditation services — to organizational design and restructuring, transportation, transaction 
assistance, and legislative and fiscal analysis. AG helps states and localities navigate the intersection 
of business and public policy while identifying opportunities that enhance the bottom-line and 
advance the health and well-being of citizens. Rather than remediate complex and outdated health 
care plans or assistance programs piecemeal, we help states and localities reform and restructure 
their entire health and human services systems. Deploying cost-effective savings methodologies to 
ensure a value-, transparent-, and efficiency-based system, our reforms drive innovation, improve 
service quality and performance, incentivize accountability and consumer engagement, modernize 
operations, and root out fraud, waste, and abuse.22 Whispering Pine Terrace 
Greenville, RI 02828 
alexandergroup@alexandergroupco.com 
